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CHAPTER I
Contradictory Marxian Crisis Theories and the U. S. Red Meat Industry
Political economists have traditionally treated capitalist crisis
as a central theoretical focus. Starting aith Marx and Engels,
Marxian political economists have vieaed crisis as a necessary result
of ordinary capitalist economic life. Recent Marxist scholars have
argued that capitalist crisis is a predominant feature of contemporary
capitalism (see e.g. Saeezy, 1970; Cogoy, 1973; Habermas, 1973;
0*Connor,1973 and 1984; Yaffe,1973; Bell,1977; Fright,1977;
Mandel,1978; Itoh, 1978; Fine and Harris, 1979; Mattick,1981;
Feeks,1981; Bell and Cleaver, 1982). Non-Marxian political economists
have also emphasized crisis in their aork ( see e. g. the neo-Ricardians
Robinson, 1965; Steindl, 1952; Kalecki, 1971). Given the focus on crisis
in political economy, and its particular prominence in Marxian theory,
the current project centers around that theme. The objective is to
systematically evaluate tao competing Marxist theories of crisis,
contrasting the "Fundamentalist” approach and its emphasis on the
tendency for the rate of profit to fall (see e.g. Matt'ick, 1969;
Cogoy,1973; Yaffe,1973) aith the "Underconsumptionist" perspective
1
(see e.g. Saeezy, 1970; Baran and Saeezy, 1966; Foster, 1986) . Data from 
raising and feeding coas, calves, hogs, and pigs (the red meat 
industry) in the United States since 1945 aill serve as a case study.
The particular focus of this project raises some important 
questions. Fhy is the study of economic crises significant from a 
Marxian perspective? Fhat is a specifically capitalist economic
2crisis? Hhat are the reasons for focusing on the Fundamentalist 
and Underconsumptionist crisis theories? Hhy has the red meat industry 
been chosen for our case study? The following section answers those 
questions.
THE CHOICE OF A RESEARCH FOCUS
My project focuses on Marxian theory because that theoretical 
tradition has liberating political change as its guiding interest. 
This focus does not mean that non-Marxian explanations reveal little 
about economic crises. Non-Marxian political economists (e. g. Adam 
Smith, Ricardo, Keynes, Sraffa, etc.) have in fact greatly influenced 
Marxian theory. Hhat makes Marxian theory preferable is that it 
presents itself as a lever for radical political change. Presenting 
some of Jurgen Habermas's work, Trent Schroyer (1970) explains that 
all scientific inquiry has inherent guiding interests. The particular 
interest of Marxian theory is to emancipate those subjected to 
"socially unnecessary modes of authority, exploitation, alienation 
[and! repression" (Shroyer, 1970: 225).
Analyses of capitalist economic crises hold special significance 
for the goal of liberating political change. From a Marxian point of 
view, one comes to see the capitalist economy as the primary source of 
socially unnecessary forms of authority, exploitation, and repression, 
and that economic crises potentially put the entire capitalist system 
at risk. Crisis theory is crucially significant to Marxian theorists 
because they believe that understanding the causes of economic crises 
can provide the necessary insights to take practical advantage of 
those crises and thereby move towards the liberation from capitalism.
A brief definition of capitalist crisis is necessary to show what
3Marxian theorists attempt to explain. "Crisis'* assumes many forms, 
varying within and across types of social formations. ffhile Habermas 
(1973:45-50) identifies four types of crises in modern capitalism—  
economic, rationality, legitimation, and motivational— my concern here 
is with economic crises, which are disruptions in processes of 
economic accumulation.
"Economic accumulation" refers to the processes by which 
capitalists appropriate greater and greater wealth. Combining raw 
materials and labor to produce commodities, capitalists then attempt 
to sell the product for more than the combined exchange values of the 
raw materials and labor. To accumulate more wealth, capitalists must 
invest part of the surplus back into the production process. Rhen, 
for whatever reason, this cycle of investment-production-surplus- 
investment-etc. breaks down, so that capitalists do not realize an 
increase in wealth or do not reinvest, then an economic crisis exists. 
For capitalists to continue as such, changes must be made to resume 
the cycle of investment-production-surplus-investment-etc. .
Marxists generally agree that understanding crises is pivotal for 
their theoretical paradigm, but they disagree over which specific 
Marxian theory most adequately explains economic crises. Hence, much 
of the contemporary debate about Marxian crisis theory has centered 
around the disagreements between the Fundamentalist and 
Underconsumptionist perspectives on crises (e.g. see Bell,1977;
4Hright, 1977; Foster, 1986).
The conflict between the Fundamentalist and Underconsumptionist 
perspectives stems from Marx* s seemingly contradictory views of
crisis. Fundamentalists base their perspective on Marx's contention 
that the falling rate of profit **is in every respect the most
important law of modern political economy” (Marx,1973;748; see e.g.
Yaffe,1973:200). Fundamentalists argue that, over time, profits tend 
to decrease relative to total investment. Production output fails to 
keep pace with increased investment, resulting in economic crises.
Underconsumptionists, on the other hand, focus on Marx* s claim 
that "the ultimate reason for all real crises always remains the 
poverty and restricted consumption of the masses" ( Marx, 1981: 615; see 
e.g. Sweezy, 1970: 177). The argument here is that capitalists produce 
more commodities then can be consumed at prices that return sufficient 
profits. For Underconsumptionists, relative overproduction causes 
economic crises. The Fundamentalist and Underconsumptionist views of 
crisis cannot coexist in the same theoretical paradigm because one 
cannot argue that the basic cause of crisis is insufficient production 
and, at the same time, overproduction ( Hright, 1977: 222).
Highlighting this contradiction in Marx' s work, Fundamentalist 
and Underconsumptionist proponents attempt to define what is the 
Marxian paradigm of crisis. Marxist scholars have used theoretical 
and, to a much lesser extent, empirical criteria to judge 
Fundamentalist and Underconsumptionist perspectives. While empirical 
investigations have not consistently substantiated the Fundamentalist 
thesis of a falling rate of profit (e.g. Gillman,1957; Hodgson,1974;
5Mandel,1975; Juttner and Murray, 1983), empirical evidence has
supported the Underconsumptionist approach (e. g. Baran and
Sweezy, 1966; Szymanski, 1984). The current study contributes to the
Fundamentalist and Underconsumptionist debate by presenting an
empirical case to test the competing theories. A project of this sort
is significant because it supplies the Fundamentalist and
Underconsumptionist debate Kith much needed empirical evidence and,
moreover, it modestly contributes to the broader goal of defining the
Marxian paradigm of crisis.
The U. S. red meat industry has been chosen as a case study to
compare the Fundamentalist and Underconsumptionist approaches. As
"the richest and most developed capitalist country" (Baran and
Saeezy, 1966: 6), the United States should have an economy that closely
typifies capitalism as described in the respective theories, and the
red meat industry typifies the agricultural sector of the U. S. economy
2
( Skaggs, 1986: 3-10). To make this project manageable in terms of data
collection and presentation, the case study examines only the raising
and feeding of red meat animals, which will be defined to include
3
cattle, calves, hogs, and pigs.
So far, based on the value position inherent in "emancipatory 
science", I have suggested the following: crisis is an important
organizing theme in Marxist political economy; the Fundamentalist and 
Underconsumptionist perspectives represent two important and 
contradictory variants of Marxian crisis theory; and, the United 
States red meat industry offers a fair empirical case to evaluate the
6competing perspectives. The following section will discuss the major 
theoretical concepts in Marxian crisis theory and identify the data 
required to measure them.
IHE CONCEPTS
Explaining the causes of economic crises, Fundamentalists and 
Underconsumptionists present their arguments in terms of relationships 
between abstract concepts. To make the Fundamentalist and 
Underconsumptionist arguments accessible to readers unfamiliar with 
those perspectives, the following summarily defines the major concepts 
and identifies the data required to measure them.
Concept: Constant Capital < c)
Definition: The value of all labor expended creating the materials
and machinery used up in production.
Indicator: The cost of materials and machines used up in
production.
Concept: Variable Capital ( v)
Definition: The value of all labor necessary to produce and 
reproduce workers’ capacity to labor.
Indigator: Hired labor costs.
Concept: Surplus Value (s)
Definition: The portion of a commodity's value for which workers 
are not paid and that capitalists appropriate.
Indicator: The difference of revenues from the production of
commodities ("gross income"), less the total costs of 
production (c + v).
7Concept:
Definition:
Indicator:
Concept:
Definition:
Indicator:
Concept:
Definition:
Indicator:
Concept:
D§finition:
Indicator:
Concept:
Definition:
Rate of Profit (r)
Return on invested capital. Notice that this ratio 
measures capital efficiency— a higher rate of profit 
indicates a higher rate of return on invested capital.
Surplus value divided by constant plus variable 
capital (s divided by c + v).
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Organic Composition of Capital (Q)
The amount of constant capital relative to the total 
labor expended during the current production process. 
This reflects the degree to Hhich industry is 
mechanized or "capital intensive".
Constant capital divided by the sum of surplus value 
plus variable capital (c divided by v + s).
Rate of Exploitation ( e)
Return relative to labor expenditures. Notice that 
this ratio measures labor efficiency— a higher rate of 
exploitation indicates a higher rate of return on 
labor expenditures.
Surplus value divided by variable capital (s divided 
by v).
Unrealized Surplus Value
Unrealized surplus value is value produced but not 
fully realized as revenue. Relatively greater amounts 
of unrealized surplus value means that commodities are 
unsold, or that commodities are exchanged for less 
than their full value, or both.
The full price-value of commodities unsold, plus the 
full price-value of commodities sold, less actual 
revenues received.
Absolute Surplus Value
Total value produced less production costs. This is a 
measure of potential profits.
Indicator: Surplus value plus unrealized surplus value.
8Concget:
Definition:
Indicator:
Concept:
Definition:
I O^i cator:
Concept:
Definition:
Indicator:
Concept:
iSition:
Output/Investment Ratio
Production output relative to capital investment.
This ratio measures capital productivity.
The number of commodities produced divided by constant 
plus variable capital. Rather than a price-value 
measure, the number of commodities produced serves as 
an indicator of production output. Using the number 
of commodities produced is a more direct measure than 
estimating full price-value for production output.
Consumption/Investment Ratio
The number of commodities consumed relative to capital 
investment. This ratio measure capital efficiency— a 
higher consumption/investment ratio indicates that a 
greater number of commodities are sold per dollar 
invested.
The number of commodities consumed divided by constant 
plus variable capital. As above, the number of 
commodities consumed provides a more direct measure of 
consumption than an estimated price-value.
Underutilized Production Capacity
The difference between the actual number of 
commodities produced, less maximum output. Lower 
values indicate greater underutilization of production 
capacity.
The actual number of commodities produced during a 
given year, less the greatest number of commodities 
produced in one year (prior to and including the year 
in question).
State Subsidies
State financial assistance to a given sector of the 
economy. This indicates the level of state 
involvement in industry. As I will discuss later, 
relatively greater state involvement in industry 
counteracts the tendency of underconsumption.
Indicator: Direct state (Federal) payments to an industry.
9Kith these concepts I Hill outline and clarify the Fundamentalist 
and Underconsumptionist approaches, eventually deriving testable 
hypotheses for each perspective.
ISI FUNDAMENTALIST APPROACH
According to Fundamentalists, the theory of a falling rate of 
profit is Marx’s only theory of crisis and the most adequate 
explanation of that phenomenon (see e.g. Cogoy, 1973; Yaf f e, 1 973;). 
Proponents of this perspective maintain that, other things being 
equal, as the organic composition of capital increases, the rate of 
profit declines. "Other things being equal" means assuming that the 
rate of exploitation remains constant. Since many factors influence 
the rate of exploitation— trade unions, government policies, employer 
organizations, exports, imports, etc.— a declining rate of profit is 
only a tendency rather than a necessity. Nevertheless,
Fundamentalists maintain that the rate of profit tends to decline over 
time.
Paraphrasing Wright’s (1977:204-206) systematic and succinct 
outline of the Fundamentalist approach, one can summarize that 
perspective in six propositions:
1) Because capitalists typically replace workers with machines and 
materials, the organic composition of capital tends to rise.
2) Unless the rate of exploitation increases sufficiently to 
counteract the increases in the organic composition of capital,
1 0
the rate of profit tends to decline.
3) Eventually the rate of exploitation cannot counteract increases 
in the organic composition of capital and the rate of profit 
declines.
4) Rhen a decline in the rate of profit sufficiently impedes the 
accumulation processes, there is an economic crisis for 
capital. Thus, underproduction of surplus value promotes the 
decline of the rate of profit.
5) The crisis conditions serve to restore the accumulation 
processes.
a) Only the most efficient and productive capitalists survive 
the crisis.
b) Those who do not survive the crisis are forced to sell 
their stock of constant capital below normal exchange 
values.
c) The crisis tends to increase unemployment thereby 
increasing competition for jobs, driving down wages, and 
increasing the rate of exploitation.
6) The crises associated with a falling rate of profit take the 
form of "business cycles". Although the conditions of crises 
restore accumulation, the cycles tend to become increasingly 
severe over time.
The assertion that the organic composition of capital and the 
rate of exploitation determine the rate of profit is a tautology 
because it can be shown that the rate of profit is a function of the
11
organic composition of capital and the rate of exploitation. 
Specifically, the rate of profit can be expressed as e / Q ( 1 + e )  + 
1 (see Wright, 1977:204). This means that the rate of profit depends 
on the organic composition of capital and the rate of exploitation. 
More importantly, by definition, the rate of profit increases when the 
rate of exploitation increases (other things being equal); and, the 
rate of profit decreases when the organic composition of capital 
increases (other things being equal).
Because the organic composition of capital and the rate of 
exploitation define the rate of profit, my task here is to test 
whether Fundamentalists correctly predict the trends associated with 
those three variables. Using the above propositions, one can derive 
three Fundamentalist hypotheses for the red meat industry from 1945 to 
1983:
FH1: The organic composition of capital has shown a tendency to 
increase.
FH2: The rate of profit has shonn a tendency to decline.
FH3: The organic composition of capital, rather than the rate of 
exploitation, is the principal determinant of the rate of 
profit.
IHE UNDERCONSUMPTIONIST APPROACH
Contemporary Marxian Underconsumptionist theorists maintain that 
underconsumption results from an excess capacity to produce 
• commodities (Bleaney, 1976; Bell, 1977: 179). Paraphrasing Wright*s
12
concise and structured account of the Underconsumptionist approach, 
one can summarize that perspective in four propositions:
1) Absolute surplus value and the rate of exploitation in
capitalist society at large tend to increase.
2) Consumption tends to fall behind the output of commodities. 
Consequently, some commodities produced remain unsold and 
others sell for less than their value, creating a "realization 
problem" for capital. In more conventional terms, supply
outstrips effective demand. The portion of absolute surplus 
value Hhich is unrealized increases over time.
3) Failure to realize full surplus value may lead to a fall in the 
rate of profit. One response to realization crises is to
create new sources of demand. The state usually takes up the 
task of creating new demand (e. g. state subsidies for crisis 
industries, imperialist Kars that stimulate the economy, etc.). 
Another response is to produce fewer commodities, thereby 
underutilizing productive capacity.
4) Tendencies toward underconsumption are present in all stages of 
capitalist development, but are most characteristic of monopoly 
capitalism.
If the Underconsumptionist theory is correct, one would expect 
that (other things being equal) (1) the amount of consumption relative 
to the sum of constant plus variable capital ( consumption/investment 
ratio) will decline over time; (2) the number of commodities produced
1 3
relative to investment (output/investment ratio) will be relatively 
static; (3) and the unrealized portion of absolute surplus value (the 
rate of unrealized surplus value) will increase over time 
(Sweezy, 1970: 183). "Other things being equal" here means holding 
constant the effects of state created demand and underutilized 
production capacity.
Using these propositions, one can derive three
Underconsumptionist hypotheses for the red meat industry from 1945 to 
1983:
UH1: The rate of unrealized surplus value has tended to increase.
UH2: Holding constant the effects of the output/investment ratio,
direct state payments to the farm sector, and the utilization 
of productive capacity, there will be a negative relationship 
between the consumption/investment ratio and the rate of 
unrealized surplus value.
UH3: Holding constant the effects of the output/investment ratio,
direct state payments to the farm sector, the utilization of 
productive capacity, and the consumption/investment ratio,
there will be a negative relationship between the rate of 
unrealized surplus value and the rate of profit.
Thus far, I have stated hypotheses for the Fundamentalist and 
Underconsumptionist perspectives. The Fundamentalist hypotheses focus 
on trends associated with the organic composition of capital, the rate 
of exploitation, and the rate of profit. The Underconsumptionist 
hypotheses, on the other hand, focus on trends associated with the
1 4
rate of unrealized surplus value and the relationships between (1) the 
consumption/investment ratio and the rate of unrealized surplus value 
and (2) the rate of unrealized surplus value and the rate of profit. 
Previous empirical studies have tested either Fundamentalist or 
Underconsumptionist hypotheses (Gillman,1957; Baran and Sweezy,1966; 
Hodgson, 1974; Mandel,1975; Juttner and Murray, 1983; Szymanski, 1984). 
The current project goes beyond previous studies by testing the 
theories against one another.
JESTING THE THEORIES AGAINST ONE ANOTHEg
The above discussion suggests that the two competing perspectives 
view economic crises quite differently. Fundamentalists maintain that 
a falling rate of profit is an economic crisis, while 
Underconsumptionists argue that an increasing rate of unrealized 
surplus value is an economic crisis. This makes it difficult to test 
the theories against one another because of their disagreement about 
how to define the central concept of "crisis". Proponents of the 
Fundamentalist -approach have suggested a crucial test of the competing 
perspectives by arguing that a falling rate of profit causes increases 
in the rate of unrealized surplus value (Cogoy, 1973: 64). If the 
Fundamentalists are correct, one would expect that (other things being 
equal) (1) as the rate of profit decreases, the rate of unrealized 
surplus value increases; and, (2) taking account of the rate of profit 
should significantly enhance our ability to predict the rate of 
unrealized surplus value. Stated as hypotheses:
1 5
Test 1: Holding constant the effects of the output/investment
ratio, direct state payments to the farm sector, 
utilization of productive capacity, and the
consumption/investment ratio, there Kill be a negative 
relationship between the rate of profit and the rate of 
unrealized surplus value.
Test 2: Hhen taking account of. the rate of profit (Test 1
hypothesis), our ability to predict the rate of unrealized 
surplus value is significantly greater than Khen He do not 
take account of the rate of profit (the second 
Underconsumptionist hypothesis, UH2).
If the second of these hypotheses holds, this nould support the 
Fundamentalist perspective. If that hypothesis is not supported, this 
would suggest that a declining rate of profit does not necessarily 
cause the rate of unrealized surplus value to increase, thus failing 
to substantiate the Fundamentalist argument against the 
Underconsumptionist perspective.
In this chapter, I have discussed the research focus of the 
current project, defined the major concepts of the competing theories, 
outlined the Fundamentalist and Underconsumptionist perspectives of 
economic crisis, derived hypotheses for both perspectives, and 
suggested a way to test the theories against one another. In the next 
chapter, I will specify measures of the concepts identified here.
Chapter II
Empirical Indicators and Measures of the Concepts
The preceding chapter offered three Fundamentalist hypotheses for 
the red meat industry from 1945 to 1983: ( FH1) The organic
composition of capital has shown a tendency to increase; (FH2) The
rate of profit has shown a tendency to decline; and, (FH3) The organic 
composition of capital, rather than the rate of exploitation, is the 
principal determinant of the rate of profit. Three
Underconsumption!st hypotheses were identified as well: (UH1) The
rate of unrealized surplus value has tended to increase; (UH2) Holding 
constant the effects of the output/investment ratio, direct state 
payments to the farm sector, and the utilization of productive 
capacity, there will be a negative relationship between the 
consumption/investment ratio and the rate of unrealized surplus value; 
and, (UH3) Holding constant the effects of the output/investment 
ratio, direct state payments to the farm sector, the utilization of 
productive capacity, and the consumption/investment ratio, there will
be a negative relationship between the rate of unrealized surplus 
value and the rate of profit.
To test the theories against one another I also derived two
further hypotheses: (Test 1) Holding constant the effects of the
output/investment ratio, direct state payments to the farm sector, 
utilization of productive capacity, and the consumption/investment 
ratio, there will be a negative relationship between the rate of 
profit and the rate of unrealized surplus value; and, (Test 2) Hhen
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taking account of the rate of profit (Test 1 hypothesis), our ability 
to predict the rate of unrealized surplus value is significantly 
greater than when we do not take account of the rate of profit 
(the second Underconsumption!st hypothesis, UH2).
To permit a test of these hypotheses, this chapter defines 
measures of the Fundamentalist and Underconsumptionist concepts.
CONCEPTS AND EMPIRICAL INDICATORS 
The last chapter identified some general empirical indicators for 
a number of crisis theory concepts. Making the definitions of the 
concepts even more concrete, the following identifies several 
components of these indicators as they apply to the empirical case at 
hand.
Concept: Constant Capital
Indicator: The costs of materials and machines used up in
production.
Components: The costs of feed, livestock, energy, machinery,
structures, overhead, and land.
Concept: Variable Capital
Indicator: The costs of labor used in production.
Components: Hired labor costs.
Concept: Surplus Value
Indicator: Total revenues less production costs (constant plus
variable capital).
Components: Total revenues from market receipts plus the imputed
prices of red meat animals slaughtered for farm 
consumption ("gross income"), less the price-values of 
constant and variable capital.
CgnQeot:
Indicator:
Components:
Concept:
Indicator:
Components:
Concept:
Indicator:
Components:
Concept:
Indicator:
Components:
Concept:
Indicator:
Components:
Concept:
Indicator:
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Rate of Profit
The ratio of surplus value to constant plus variable 
capital.
( As defined above).
Organic Composition of Capital
Constant capital divided by the sum of surplus value 
and variable capital.
(As defined above).
Rate of Exploitation
Surplus value divided by variable capital. 
(As defined above).
Unrealized Surplus Value
The full price-value of commodities unsold, plus the 
full price-value of commodities sold, less actual 
revenues received.
An imputed full price-value for those animals unsold 
(but Hhich are not part of a normal stock Hithheld 
from the market), plus an imputed full price-value for 
red meat animals sold, plus an imputed full price- 
value for red meat animals slaughtered for farm 
consumption, less "gross income" (as defined above).
Absolute Surplus Value
Surplus value plus unrealized surplus value.
( As defined above.)
Output/Investment Ratio
The number of commodities produced divided by constant 
and variable capital.
Components: The number of red meat animals born during the year
divided by constant and variable capital.
Cogcept: Consumption/Investment Ratio
Indicator: The number of commodities consumed divided by constant
and variable capital.
Comggnents: The number of red meat animals marketed, plus the
number of red meat animals slaughtered for farm 
consumption divided by constant and variable capital.
Concept: Underutilized Production Capacity
Indicator: The actual number of commodities produced during a
given year, less the greatest number of commodities
produced in one year ( prior to and including the year 
in question).
Components: The actual number of red meat animals born during a
given year, less the greatest number of red meat
animals born in one year (prior to and including the 
year in question).
Concept: State Subsidies
Indicator: Direct state payments to an industry.
Components: Direct Federal payments to the farm sector in constant 
dollars.
DATA SOURCES AND ASSUMPTIONS
The availability of data has greatly influenced the selection and 
calculations of empirical indicators. For many years, including 1945 
to 1983, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has estimated the 
"value of production" (total production costs) and "gross income" 
(cash market receipts plus the price-value for red meat animals 
slaughtered for farm consumption) (Agricultural Statistics). From 
their figures, one can obtain a surplus value estimate by subtracting 
the "value of production" from "gross income". Dividing that estimate
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of surplus value by the "value of production" would approximate the 
rate of profit for the red meat industry. -
Although the USDA figures permit easy calculation of surplus 
value and the rate of profit, more detailed data is needed to 
determine the specific components of total production costs. In 
particular, the USDA data does not separate total production costs
into constant capital (material and machines) and variable capital
(labor costs). Such detailed information is necessary for computing 
the organic composition of capital.
To deal with this problem, the USDA figures for "gross income" 
have been used to measure total revenue, but I have employed other 
data sources to separate the components of total production costs 
(constant and variable capital). Although in recent years the 
Economic Research Service division of the USDA has reported detailed 
accounts of the costs of production by commodity (e.g. "fed cattle
production", "cow-calf production", "feeder pig production", etc.),
such data is not available prior to 1980 (see Economic Indicators of 
the Farm Sector). Data sources that include all the years since 1945, 
however, give production costs for the entire farm sector, rather than 
specific commodities (e. g. red meat animals) (see Lucier, et 
al.,1986:1-8). Even though we would ideally want finer figures, data 
for the entire farm sector is the only source that allows us to 
determine the components of total production costs for all the years 
since 1945.
Because the best available data reports the costs of production
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for the entire farm sector only, one must develop procedures to 
estimate what portion of those costs belong to the red meat industry. 
To prevent errors that bias the measures in favor of the hypotheses, I 
have used assumptions (where necessary) that work against the 
Fundamentalist and Underconsumptionist hypotheses. For example, 
evidence showing that the rate of profit has declined since 1945 would 
support both the Fundamentalist and Underconsumptionist hypotheses. 
Hence, any measurement assumptions for surplus value and total 
production costs should purposefully err toward higher figures for 
surplus value and lower figures for total production costs, thus 
producing higher rates of profit and making it more difficult to 
substantiate the Fundamentalist and Underconsumptionist hypotheses.
The following summarizes my measurements and assumptions for 
developing empirical indicators for the red meat industry. (For a 
more complete discussion see Appendix A. )
Constant and Variable Capital
Concept: Constant Capital
Component: Feed Costs
Data Source: Based on feed costs for the entire farm sector 
(Lucier, et al. , 1986:22)
Objective: Determine what portion of the feed costs for the
entire farm sector belong to the red meat industry
Formula: Feed Costs for Red Meat Animals
- Feed Costs for the Entire Farm Sector 
* (Cash Market Receipts from Red Meat Animals 
/ Cash Market Receipts from All Livestock)
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£§§UQ!Btign§
and
Problems:
Concept: 
Component: 
Data Source:
Objective:
Formula:
Assumptions
and
Problems:
Concept: 
Component: 
Data Source:
Objective:
Formula:
Costs are apportioned to the red meat industry 
according to its share of revenues from the entire 
farm sector.
Constant Capital 
Livestock Costs
Based on feeder livestock costs for the entire farm 
sector (Lucier, et al, 1986: 22)
Determine what portion of the feeder livestock costs 
for the entire farm sector belong to the red meat 
industry
Livestock Costs for Red Meat Animals 
= Livestock Costs for the Entire Farm Sector 
* (Cash Market Receipts from Red Meat Animals 
/ Cash Market Receipts from All Livestock)
Again, costs are apportioned to the red meat industry 
according to its share of revenues from the entire 
farm sector. The reader should note that only the 
costs of feeder livestock are used to estimate total 
livestock expenses. Such an estimate does not count 
the costs of breeding stock and, therefore, 
underestimates total livestock expenses.
Constant Capital 
Energy Costs
Based on fuel, oil, and electricity (energy) costs for 
the entire farm sector (Lucier, et al,1986:22)
Determine what portion of energy costs for the entire 
farm sector belong to the red meat industry
Energy Costs for Red Meat Animals 
= Energy Costs for the Entire Farm Sector 
* (Cash Market Receipts from Red Meat Animals 
/ Cash Market Receipts from All Farm Commodities)
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ASSSiBDLiQBS
and
Problems:
Concept: 
Component: 
Data Source:
Objective:
Formula:
Assumptions
Problems:
Concept: 
Component: 
D§ta Source:
Objective:
Because feed and livestock costs apply exclusively to 
livestock production, only the receipts from livestock 
production are used to determine red meat animals' 
share of those expenses. Here, however, because 
energy costs apply to all farm production, it is 
necessary to use the receipts from all farm 
commodities for that figure.
Constant Capital 
Machinery Costs
Based on the costs of tractors and trucks for the 
entire farm sector (Lucier, et al,1986:26)
Determine trhat portion of tractor and truck costs for 
the entire farm sector belong to the red meat industry
Machinery Costs for Red Meat Animals 
= Tractor and Truck Costs for the Entire Farm Sector 
* ( Cash Market Receipts from Red Meat Animals 
/ Cash Market Receipts from All Farm Commodities)
Researchers of the red meat industry identify tractors 
and trucks as the major machinery expenses (Boykin, et 
al.,1980:106-109; Van Arsdall, 1978: 1978: 60-62). My 
estimates therefore restrict the costs of machinery to 
those two items. As above, because tractor and truck 
costs apply to all farm production, receipts from all 
farm production are used to figure the apportioned 
costs.
Constant Capital 
Structure Costs
Based on the costs of service buildings for the entire 
farm sector (Lucier, et al,1986:26)
Determine Hhat portion of service building costs for 
the entire farm sector belong to red meat animal 
production
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EQOQUli:
Assumptions
and
Probl ems:
Concept: 
Component: 
Data Source:
Objective:
Formula:
Assumptions
and
Problems:
Structure Costs for Swine Production 
= Service Building Costs for the Entire Farm Sector 
* (Cash Market Receipts from Swine 
/ Cash Market Receipts from All Farm Commodities)
Other research supports the assumption that the oust 
of structures for beef production is negligible 
(Boykin, et al.,1980:95). The only applicable costs 
for red meat animals, then, would be the structure 
costs for swine production. Again, because service 
building costs apply to all farm production, the 
receipts from all farm commodities are used to arrive 
at the apportioned structure costs.
Constant Capital 
Overhead Costs
Based on veterinary, livestock marketing, repairs, 
operations, telephone, and other miscellaneous costs 
for the entire farm sector (Lucier, et al,1986:24)
Determine what portion of veterinary, livestock 
marketing, repairs, operations, telephone, and other 
miscellaneous overhead costs for the entire farm 
sector belong to the red meat industry
Overhead Costs for Red Meat Animals 
= (Veterinary and Livestock Marketing Costs 
for the Entire Farm Sector
* (Cash Market Receipts from Red Meat Animals
/ Cash Market Receipts from All Livestock)]
+ (Repairs, Operations, Telephone, and Other
Miscellaneous Overhead costs for the Entire Farm
Sector
* (Cash Market Receipts from Red Meat Animals
/ Cash Market Receipts from All Farm Commodities)1
The total overhead costs for the entire farm sector 
consists of two kinds of expenses: 1) those that
apply only to livestock production— veterinary and 
livestock marketing expenses; and, 2) those that apply 
to all farm production— repairs, operations, 
telephone, and other miscellaneous expenses.
Employing the methods described for the above 
estimates of feed and energy, my estimates of
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Concept: 
Component: 
Data Source:
Objective:
Formula:
Assumptions
and
Problems:
livestock overhead use cash receipts From livestock 
production; and my estimates of general farm overhead 
use cash receipts from all farm commodities.
Constant Capital 
1
Land Costs
Based on rent, property taxes, and mortgage interest 
costs from the entire farm sector (Lucier, et 
al,1986:23, 25), land utilization statistics 
(Agricultural Statistics, 1985: 372), and land value 
figures ( Us.S^ Census of Agriculture, 1 945: 1; 1974:76-
77; 1978: 102-103).
Determine what portion of rent, mortgage interest, and 
property taxes ("land costs") for the entire farm 
sector belong to beef production
Land Costs for Beef Production 
= Land Costs for the Entire Farm Sector
* (Acres of Private Pasture and Grassland 
/ Acres of All Farmland)
* (Average value of an Acre Used for Grazing
Livestock
/ Average value of an Acre Used for All Farm
Production)
* (Cash Market Receipts from Cattle and Calves
/ Cash Market Receipts from All Grazing Livestock)
Other research supports the assumption that the cost 
of land for swine production is negligible (Van 
Arsdall and Gilliam, 1979: 194-195). The only 
applicable costs for red meat animals, then, would be 
the land expenses for beef production. The ratio of 
acres of land used for grazing animals to total 
farmland times the ratio of the average value of an 
acre of land used for livestock production to the 
average value of an acre of land in all farm 
production equals the ratio of land costs for grazing 
animals to total farm land costs. Because the value 
per acre of land used in livestock production divided 
by the value per acre of all farm land has been 
relatively stable since 1945 ( 61.0% in 1945, 62.2% in
1974, 65.1% in 1978), my estimates set this ratio at 
60. 0% for all forty years ( U^S._ Census of 
Agricultural). Essentially this estimates the total 
land costs for all grazing animals, and we must now
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find the portion of that cost which belongs to beef 
production. As in estimating feed and livestock
expenses, my estimates assume that the ratio of land
costs for beef production to land costs for all 
grazing livestock is the same as the ratio for their 
respective market receipts.
Concept: Variable Capital
Component: Hired Labor Costs
6§ta Source: Based on hired labor costs for the entire farm sector
(Lucier, et al, 1986: 23) and statistics reflecting 
labor hours (Economic Indicators of the Farm 
Sector, 1984: 31)
Determine what portion of hired labor costs for the 
entire farm sector belong to the production of red 
meat animals.
Hired Labor Costs for Red Meat Animals 
= (Hired Labor Costs for the Entire Farm Sector 
/ Total Farm Labor Hours)
* Hours Spent Raising Meat Animals
* (Cash Market Receipts from Red Meat Animals 
/ Cash Market Receipts from Meat Animals)
The above formula first calculates an average hourly 
wage for all farm labor. Then, multiplying the 
average hourly wage by the hours spent raising meat 
animals produces the hired labor costs for the meat 
industry. To figure what portion of hired labor costs 
for the meat industry belongs to red meat animals, the 
formula multiplies the former by the appropriate cash 
market receipt ratio.
The sum of these costs approximates total production costs 
(constant plus variable capital). Kith the revenue data ("gross 
income**), one can easily estimate surplus value, the rate of profit,
Objective:
Formula:
Assumptions
Problems:
the organic composition of capital, and the rate of exploitation.
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SQ£§ali2§g Surplus Value and Qthec Underconsuatptiooist Cgpggpts
Unlike the estimates of production costs, my measures of the 
central Underconsumptionist concepts do not require apportioning 
procedures. The following summarizes my measurements for developing 
indicators for unrealized surplus value, the output/investment ratio, 
consumption/investment ratio, underutilized production capacity, 
direct state payments to the farm sector, and absolute surplus value.
Concept: 
Component: 
Data Source:
Objective:
Formula:
Unrealized Surplus Value (Beef Production)
Imputed Price for Unsold Beef
Based on beef inventory and its disposition 
(Agricultural Statistics, 1967: 367,372; 1983:265, 272;
1985:256, 263)
Determine the overproduction of beef and then estimate 
its price-value
Imputed Price for Unsold Beef 
= Total Beef Inventory as of January 1 
+ Cattle Shipped In During the Year 
+ Calves Born During the Year ("calf crop")
Cattle and Calves that Die During the Year 
Following Year's Inventory of Milk Cows ( this 
includes milk cows and milk cow replacements)
- Cattle Other than Beef Cattle
Following Year’s Necessary Inventory (includes 
bulls and other "stocker cattle")
- Calves Not Ready for Market (this includes calves
under 500 pounds)
Cattle and Calves Marketed
Cattle and Calves Slaughtered for Farm Consumption
The greatest price received per head from 1945 up 
to and including the year in question, which is
calculated as 
The Number of Cattle and Calves Marketed
and Slaughtered for Farm Consumption 
"Gross Income" for Beef Production
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Assumptions
and
Problems:
Concept: 
Component: 
Data Source:
Objective:
Formula:
Assumptions
and
Problems:
Concept: 
Indicator: 
Data Source:
Objective:
Assuming that all of the following year's inventory of 
stocker cattle is "necessary" and all calves under 500 
pounds are not ready for market may underestimate 
excess inventory. My calculations assume that surplus 
value is never greater than the full price-value for 
red meat animals. Hhen the year in question has a 
greater return per animal than all preceding years, 
then surplus value equals full price-value.
Unrealized Surplus Value (Beef Production)
Difference Between Full Price-Value and Actual Revenue
Based on beef inventory and its disposition 
(Agricultural Statistics, 1967: 372; 1983:272; 1985:263)
Determine the difference between the full price-value 
for cattle and calves sold and the actual amount 
received.
Full Price-Value Less Actual Beef Revenues 
= The greatest price received per head from 1945 up 
to and including the year in question, which is
calculated as 
(The Number of Cattle and Calves Marketed 
and Slaughtered for Farm Consumption 
/ "Gross Income" for Beef Production)
* The Number of Cattle and Calves Marketed and
Slaughtered for Farm Consumption 
"Gross Income" for Beef
See the above assumptions concerning surplus value and 
full price-value.
Unrealized Surplus Value (Swine Production)
Imputed Price for Unsold Swine
Based on swine inventory and its disposition 
(Agricultural Statistics, 1 967: 381, 386; 1983: 280, 282;
1985:271, 274)
Determine the overproduction of swine and then 
estimate its price-value
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Formula:
Assumptions
and
Problems:
Imputed Price for Unsold Swine 
= (Total Swine Inventory as of January 1 
+ Pigs Born During the Year ("pig crop")
- Hogs that Die During the Year
- Following Year's Necessary Inventory ("stocker 
swine" which includes sows farrowing plus boars 
which are estimated as 5% of the number of sows
farrowing)
- Pigs Not Ready for Market (this includes five sixths
of the pigs)
- Hogs and Pigs Marketed
- Hogs and Pigs Slaughtered for Farm Consumption)
* The greatest price received per swine from 1945 up
to and including the year in question, which is
calculated as 
(The Number of Hogs and Pigs Marketed
and Slaughtered for Farm Consumption 
/ "Gross Income" for Swine)
The data for pig crops already adjust for pigs lost 
between farrowing and weaning. So as not to 
overestimate excess inventory, after weaning death 
loss is set as a certain percentage of the total pig 
crop. Based on characteristics of the industry, the 
percentage is as follows: from 1945 to 1950 it equals
2%; from 1951 to 1960 the percentage declines steadily 
by .07%; from 1960 to 1979, the percentage continues 
to decrease, but at .01%; from 1970 to 1978, the 
percentage increases evenly by .065%; and, from 1978 
to 1983, the percentage is 1.75% (Van 
Arsdall, 1978: 29). The number of boars kept for 
breeding is 5% of the farrowing sows ( Van 
Arsdall, 1978: 18). Because it takes about six months 
to ready a pig for market, my calculations assume that 
five sixths of those pigs born after June 1 were not 
ready for market, and, therefore, should be excluded 
from estimated excess inventory (Van Arsdall,1978: 29). 
See the above assumptions for surplus value. Also see 
the assumptions for "Imputed Price for Unsold Beef" as 
they relate to surplus value and full price-value.
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SQBQept: 
Component: 
Di£a Source:
Objective:
Formula:
Assumptions
and
Problems:
Concept: 
Component: 
Data Source:
Objective:
Formula:
Assumptions
and
Problems:
Unrealized Surplus Value (Swine Production)
Difference Between Full Price-Value and Actual Revenue
Based on swine inventory and its disposition 
( Agricultural Statistics, 1967: 381, 386; 1983:280, 282;
1985:271, 274))
Determine the difference between the full price-value 
of hogs and pigs sold and the actual amount received.
Full Price-Value Less Actual Swine Revenues 
= The greatest price received per swine from 1945 up 
to and including the year in question, which is
calculated as 
(The Number of Hogs and Pigs Marketed
and Slaughtered for Farm Consumption 
/ "Gross Income" for Swine Production)
* The Number of Hogs and Pigs Marketed and
Slaughtered for Farm Consumption 
- "Gross Income" for Swine
See the above assumptions for "Imputed Price for 
Unsold Beef" as they apply to surplus value and full 
price-value.
Output/Investment Ratio
Number of Red Meat Animals Produced/Investment
Based on red meat animal inventory and its disposition 
<Agricultural Statistics, 1967: 372, 381; 1983:272, 280; 
1985:263, 271))
Determine the number of red meat animals "produced" 
relative to investment
Output/Investment Ratio 
- Number of Red Meat Animals Born During the Year 
/ Constant and Variable Capital
See the assumptions for the components of constant and 
variable capital.
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GQDeepf. 
Component: 
Data Source:
Objective:
Formula:
Assumptions
and
Problems:
Concept:
Component:
Data Source: 
Objective:
Formula:
Assumptions
and
Probl ems:
Consumption/Investment Ratio
Number of Red Meat Animals Consumed/Investment
Based on red meat animal inventory and its disposition 
(Agricultural Statistics, 1967:372, 282; 1983:272, 282;
1985:263, 274)
Determine the number of red meat animals "consumed" 
relative to investment
Consumption/Investment Ratio 
= Red Meat Animals Marketed
+ Red Meat Animals Slaughtered for Farm Consumption 
/ Constant and Variable Capital
Because they Kill most likely be marketed at some 
later time, red meat animals used as inventory 
replacements are not considered "consumed". This is 
to avoid overestimating consumption by counting some 
animals twice.
Underutilized Production Capacity
Difference Between the Actual Number of Red Meat 
Animals Produced, Less Maximum Output
Based on red meat animal inventory and its disposition 
(Agricultural Statistics,1967: 372, 381; 1983:272, 280;
1985: 263, 271)
Determine the difference between the actual number of 
red meat animals born during the year, less the 
greatest number of red meat animals born in one year 
(prior to and including the year in question)
Underutilized Production Capacity 
= The Number of Red Meat Animals Born During the Year 
The greatest number of red meat animals born in one 
year from 1945 up to and including the year in
question
Hhen the number of red meat animals born for the year 
in question is greater than those of preceding years, 
then underutilized production capacity is zero.
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QQDSSB& State Subsidies
Component: Direct State (Federal) Payments to the Farm Sector
5§t§ Source: Based on farm income statistics (Lucier, et.
al. , 1986: 1 4)
Objective: Determine the level of state involvement in the red
meat industry
Formula: Convert state payments to the farm sector into
constant 1967 dollars (See Appendix A).
Assumptions
and
Problems: The portion of direct state payments that belong
solely to red meat animals is not calculated because 
state assistance to other sectors of the farm economy 
also benefit red meat producers (e.g. assistance to 
those who raise feed crops makes feed cheaper for 
producers of red meat animals).
Unrealized surplus value is estimated by adding an imputed price 
for unsold red meat animals and the difference between full price- 
value for red meat animals sold and actual revenue received. The sum 
of unrealized surplus value and surplus value estimates absolute 
surplus value. Dividing unrealized surplus value by absolute surplus 
value yields the rate of unrealized surplus value.
All of the preceding measures of Marxian economic concepts rely 
on a tacit assumption, namely, that price is an adequate indicator for 
Marx* s concepts of value. This immediately raises, a validity 
question: Are empirical indicators based on price acceptable for
concepts based on Marx' s theory of value?
The theoretical difference between price and value is 
significant. The Marxist concept of value emphasizes that the 
capitalist mode of production necessarily exploits the working class,
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thus focusing on social relationships between human beings. By
contrast, classical economists and their disciples argue that the laws 
of commodity exchange (supply and demand) determine price, thus
stressing relationships between things. One way to bring these
conceptions together is to regard price as the phenomenal form of 
value (Juttner and Murray, 1983:376). To view price as a phenomenal 
form of value, one must recognize that value has qualitative and 
quantitative aspects. The qualitative aspect of value, and what 
distinguishes it from the classical concept of price, is the emphasis 
on class relations; the quantitative aspect is the amount of labor 
time used up in production (Bright, 1977: 197-198). Here price is a 
quantitative indicator of the amount of labor time used up in
production. Using price as a quantitative indicator of value has 
precedent in the empirical studies of Marxian economists (see e.g. 
Hodgson, 1974; Baran and Sweezy, 1966; Handel, 1978; Juttner and 
Murray, 1 983).
Besides the validity problem, another important question is 
raised by my estimating procedures. How accurate are my estimates of 
production costs? Ideally, one would check the accuracy of my 
estimates by comparing them to some other approximation of production 
costs. At the beginning of this section, I noted that the USDA has 
estimated total production costs for the red meat industry, but that 
those figures could not be used because they do not separate total 
production costs into constant capital and variable capital. Here, 
nonetheless, we can use the USDA figures for total production costs to 
check the accuracy of my estimates for total production costs. If
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Table 2j_i
COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED TOTAL BEEF PRODUCTION COSTS 
BILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
YEAR RESEARCH USDA PERCENTAGE
DIFFERENCE
YEAR RESEARCH USDA PERCENTAG1
DIFFERENC1
1 945 2. 97 3. 02 -1. 72% 1965 6. 50 6. 95 -6. 47%
1 946 2. 76 3. 04 -9. 34% 1 966 7. 1 4 7. 60 -6.02%
1947 3. 59 3. 79 -5. 15% 1 967 7. 56 8. 07 -6. 33%
1948 3. 79 4. 06 -6. 74% 1968 7. 58 8. 42 -9. 98%
1 949 3. 65 4. 32 -1 5. 46% 1969 7. 84 9. 1 4 -14. 29%
1 950 4. 34 5. 29 -17. 96% 1 970 8. 38 9. 77 -1 4. 24%
1951 4. 77 6. 21 -23. 19% 1 971 9. 06 10. 21 -11.23%
1952 4. 44 5. 87 -24. 38% 1972 9. 92 11. 57 -14. 30%
1 953 3. 49 4. 57 -23. 56% 1973 10. 22 11. 40 -10. 36%
1954 3. 79 4. 53 -16. 39% 1974 7. 91 8. 40 -5. 91 %
1955 4. 06 4. 76 -14. 76% 1975 6. 97 6. 95 0, 21 %
1956 4. 05 4. 52 -10. 48% 1976 7. 85 7. 55 3. 99%
1957 4. 40 4. 88 -9.76% 1977 8. 08 7. 40 9. 08%
1958 5. 30 6. 05 -12. 30% 1 978 10. 03 9. 46 6. 01 %
1 959 6. 00 6. 90 -1 3. 06% 1979 11. 39 11. 42 -0. 31 %
1960 5. 39 6. 26 -1 3. 75% 1980 9. 74 10. 41 -6. 45%
1961 5. 62 6. 48 -13. 17% 1981 8. 30 9. 42 -11.90%
1962 6. 24 6. 98 -10. 53% 1982 7. 90 9. 09 -1 3. 1 1 %
1 963 6. 40 7. 03 -8. 94% 1983 7. 91 8. 67 -8.73%
1 964 5. 98 6. 74 -11.29%
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Table 2._2
COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED TOTAL SHINE PRODUCTION COSTS 
BILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
YEAR RESEARCH USDA PERCENTAGE
DIFFERENCE
YEAR RESEARCH USDA PERCENTAG1
DIFFERENC1
1 945 1. 80 3. 36 -46.36% 1965 2. 52 3. 83 -34.03%
1 946 2. 03 3. 60 -43. 48% 1 966 2. 75 4. 21 -34.61 %
1 947 2. 68 4. 62 -42. 07% 1967 2. 66 3. 89 -31.65%
1 948 2. 51 4. 14 -39. 48% 1968 2. 47 3. 81 -35. 1 7%
1 949 2. 25 3. 94 -42.83% 1969 2. 85 4. 22 -32.49%
1 950 2. 35 3. 87 -39. 31% 1970 2. 67 4. 44 -39. 77%
1951 2. 53 4. 01 -36.95% 1971 2. 42 3. 50 -30.94%
1952 2. 35 3. 43 -31. 31 % 1 972 2. 77 4. 29 -35.25%
1953 2. 34 3. 73 -37. 26% 1 973 3. 27 4. 86 -32.78%
1954 2. 43 4. 12 -41.08% 1 974 2. 92 3. 85 -24. 24%
1955 1. 98 3. 33 -40.48% 1975 3. 00 4. 21 -28. 76%
1 956 1. 89 3. 03 -37.56% 1 976 2. 94 4. 29 -31.38%
1957 2. 16 3. 49 -38.02% 1 977 2. 82 3. 96 -28.77%
1958 2. 32 3. 84 -39.52% 1978 3. 05 4. 39 -30.48%
1 959 2. 09 3. 20 -34. 65% 1979 2. 88 4. 10 -29. 86%
1 960 2. 05 3. 1 4 -34. 68% 1 980 2. 63 3. 62 -27.37%
1961 2. 28 3. 58 -36. 41 % 1 981 2. 60 3. 79 -31.39%
1962 2. 35 3. 50 -32. 75% 1 982 2. 63 4. 1 4 -36.40%
1963 2. 32 3. 33 -30.42% 1983 2. 53 3. 90 -35.01 %
1964 2. 25 3. 21 -29.82%
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my estimates of the components of total costs are accurate* they ought 
to add up to a total comparable to those of the USDA.
Comparing my estimates for total beef production costs with those 
of the USDA shons that my figures are consistently smaller than the 
USDA based estimates for all years except 1975 to 1978 (Table 2.1). 
Honever, my estimates and the USDA based alternative are highly 
correlated* r=. 974, thus suggesting comparable measurements (Figures 
2.11 and 2.12). My estimates for total snine production costs are 
consistently smaller than the USDA alternative (Table 2.2). 
Nevertheless, the two estimates are highly correlated, r=. 829,
indicating comparable measurements (Figures 2.21 and 2.22). Based on 
these comparisons, my estimates of total production costs appear to be 
reasonably accurate.
In this chapter, I have specified measures of the economic 
concepts. In the next chapter, I Kill use the Fundamentalist and 
Underconsumptionist variables, as they are defined and measured here, 
to test their respective hypotheses.
Chapter III
Jests of the Fundamentalist and Underconsumptionist Hypotheses
Using the variables outlined in the preceding chapter, this 
chapter tests Fundamentalist and Underconsumptionist hypotheses for 
the red meat industry from 1945 to 1983. Because my objective is to 
evaluate the competing models, this chapter does not "correct" those 
perspectives by introducing alternative theoretical explanations of 
the data. Rather than constructing a post hoc theoretical
interpretation of the data, I will determine whether the 
Fundamentalist and Underconsumptionist hypotheses hold for the case of 
the red meat industry.
TESTS OF JHE FUNDAMENTALIST HYPOTHESES
The Fundamentalist perspective maintains that capitalists
typically replace workers with machines and materials, thereby 
increasing the organic composition of capital. Hithout an offsetting 
increase in the rate of exploitation, the rate of profit will decline. 
The Fundamentalist perspective further asserts that the rate of
exploitation eventually cannot counteract increases in the organic 
composition of capital; so that in the long run, the rate of profit 
will decline.
The following section will examine economic trends in the red
meat industry to determine if the Fundamentalist hypotheses hold. 
Because the rate of profit is a function of the organic composition of 
capital and the rate of exploitation, it would be a tautology to
"prove" that the latter two variables determine the rate of profit. 
Thus, the task of this section is to determine whether the organic 
composition of capital has increased and the rate of profit has
declined, as predicted by the Fundamentalist hypotheses.
Three Fundamentalist hypotheses were identified for the red meat
industry from 1945 to 1983. Re will examine each in order of
presentation. The first Fundamentalist hypothesis states:
FH1: The organic composition of capital has shown a tendency to 
increase.
Table 3^1
ESTIMATED ORGANIC
BEEF
COMPOSITION
PRODUCTION
OF CAPITAL
CATTLE CATTLE
Year AND
CALVES
Year AND
CALVES
1945 1. 77 1965 1. 87
1946 1. 55 1966 1. 90
1947 1. 73 1967 1. 98
1 948 2. 09 1 968 1. 76
1 949 1. 67 1 969 1. 67
1 950 1. 99 1970 1. 76
1951 2. 10 1971 1. 80
1952 2. 12 1972 1. 66
1953 1. 71 1973 2. 14
1954 1. 92 1974 2. 58
1 955 1. 84 1975 2. 06
1956 1. 69 1976 2. 1 8
1957 1. 77 1 977 2. 30
1 958 1. 92 1978 2. 22
1959 1. 96 1979 2. 39
1960 1. 70 1 980 2. 39
1 961 1. 78 1981 2. 00
1962 2. 00 1982 1. 64
1963 2. 15 1983 1. 94
1 964 1. 92
SOURCE: see Tables A1.21 and A1.3
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Table 3._2
ESTIMATED ORGANIC
SHINE
COMPOSITION
PRODUCTION
OF CAPITAL
HOGS HOGS
Year AND
PIGS
Year AND
PIGS
1 945 0. 96 1965 1. 59
1946 1. 01 1 966 1. 64
1947 1.11 1967 1. 76
1948 1. 33 1968 1. 55
1949 1.17 1969 1. 49
1950 1. 39 1970 1. 57
1951 1. 48 1971 1. 64
1 952 1. 49 1972 1. 46
1 953 1. 22 1973 1. 79
1 954 1. 36 1 974 2. 1 2
1955 1. 35 1 975 1 . 74
1956 1. 27 1976 1. 90
1957 1. 35 1977 2. 01
1 958 1. 43 1978 2. 01
1959 1. 62 1979 2. 1 5
1 960 1. 44 1980 2. 07
1 961 1. 50 1981 1. 69
1962 1. 71 1 982 1. 37
1963 1. 82 1 983 1. 65
1 964 1. 64
SOURCE: see Tables A1.22 and A1.3
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The organic composition of capital for beef production was 
relatively stable from 1945 to 1973. After 1973, the organic 
composition of capital increased sharply. Table 3.1 and Figure 3.11 
show that the organic composition of capital was the lowest in 1946 
(1.55) and the greatest in 1974 (2.58). From 1947 to 1973, the
organic composition of capital for beef production fluctuated 
randomly, ranging from 1.66 in 1973 to 2.15 in 1963. Since 1980, the 
organic composition of capital has declined, reaching a level in 1982 
(1.64) that was actually less than that in 1945 (1.77).
Figure 3.12 plots a "moving average" of the organic composition
of capital that minimizes random variations and allows us to see
1
overall trends in the data. The trend line of Figure 3.12 shows that 
the organic composition of capital for beef production has tended to 
increase slightly since 1945. The organic composition of capital has 
increased by less than 10 percent from 1945 (1.77) to 1983 (1.94). Up 
until the early 1970s, the organic composition of capital was
relatively stable for beef production. Only during the 1970s has the 
organic composition of capital shown a tendency to increase. The 
organic composition of capital since the 1970s has declined, moving 
towards the pre-1970 levels. At best, the data seems to weakly 
support the hypothesis that the organic composition of capital for 
beef production increased from 1945 to 198-3.
Table 3. 2, Figure 3. 21 and Figure 3. 22 show trends in the
organic composition of capital for swine production are quite 
different from those for beef. For swine production, the organic 
composition of capital was lowest in 1945 (.96) and greatest in 1979
45
ESTIMATED RATE OF PROFIT 
BEEF PRODUCTION
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
1 945 44. 7% 1 965 44. 1 %
1946 52. 8% 1966 43. 6%
1947 49. 3% 1967 41. 8%
1948 39. 9% 1968 47. 5%
1949 50. 6% 1969 51. 0%
1950 41. 6% 1970 48. 2%
1951 39. 7% 1 971 47. 7%
1952 38. 7% 1972 53. 0%
1953 48. 3% 1973 40. 3%
1954 43. 1% 1974 30. 8%
1955 44. 7% 1975 40. 1 %
1956 48. 9% 1976 37. 7%
1957 47. 1 % 1977 35. 8%
1958 43. 8% 1978 39. 0%
1959 42. 6% 1979 36. 5%
1 960 49. 1 % 1 980 36. 2%
1961 46. 5% 1 981 44. 5%
1962 41. 2% 1982 54. 6%
1 963 37. 9% 1 983 45. 5%
1964 42. 4%
SOURCE: see Tables A1.21 and A1.3
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ESTIMATED RATE OF PROFIT 
SHINE PRODUCTION
Year
HOGS
AND
PIGS
Year
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1945 86. 6% 1 965 52. 4%
1946 84. 0% 1966 51. 3%
1 947 79. 2% 1 967 47. 5%
1 948 65. 1% 1968 54. 4%
1 949 74. 1 % 1969 57. 7%
1950 61. 6% 1970 54. A%
1 951 58. 1 % 1971 52. 8%
1 952 57. 0% 1972 60. 7%
1953 69. 8% 1 973 48. 7%
1 954 62. 6% 1 974 38. 3%
1955 62. 5% 1975 48. 1 %
1 956 66. 6% 1 976 43. 9%
1957 63. 1 % 1977 41. 5%
1958 60. 0% 1978 43. 4%
1959 52. 5% 1 979 40. 9%
1960 58. 6% 1980 42. 3%
1961 56. 3% 1 981 52. 9%
1 962 49. 0% 1 982 65. 5%
1 963 45. 6% 1 983 54. 0%
1 964 50. 2%
SOURCE: see Tables A1.22 and A1.3
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(2.15). The organic composition of capital has increased by about 70
percent from 1945 (.96) to 1983 (1.65). Although the organic
composition of capital has declined after 1979, most of the period
shotted a clearly increasing trend. Excepting 1980 to 1983, sttine
production data supports the first Fundamentalist hypothesis.
To test the second Fundamentalist hypothesis, one must examine 
rate of profit trends. The second Fundamentalist hypothesis states: 
FH2: The rate of profit has shown a tendency to decline.
The rate of profit for beef production varied only slightly from 
1945 to 1983. Table 3.3 and Figure 3.31 show it stayed within a 
relatively narrow range of 25% (30% to 55%). As Figure 3.32 shows, 
the rate of profit has generally been stable, excepting the 1970s. 
The rate of profit has actually increased by about 2 percent from 1945
(44.7%) to 1983 ( 45.5%). From 1945 to 1972, the rate of profit for
beef production randomly fluctuated between 38% and 53%. It declined 
after 1972, decreasing to a low of 30.8% in 1974. Although the rate
of profit was depressed during most of the 1970s, it has increased
since 1980. Overall, the data for beef production does not generally 
support a declining rate of profit hypothesis.
In contrast to those for beef, the rate of profit estimates for 
swine production has tended to decline. Table 3. 4 and Figure 3.41 
show that the rate of profit was the lowest in 1974 (38.3%) and the 
greatest in 1945 (86.6%). Figure 3.42 shows a clearly decreasing 
trend. The rate of profit has decreased by about 38 percent from 1945 
(86.6%) to 1983 (54.0%). Although the rate of profit has increased
50
since 1980* the data generally support the second Fundamentalist 
hypothesis.
To test the third Fundamentalist hypothesis, one must see how
well the organic composition of capital predicts the rate of profit. 
Recall the third Fundamentalist hypothesis:
FH3: The organic composition of capital, rather than the rate of
exploitation, is the principal determinant of the rate of
profit.
If this hypothesis is true, then a linear regression equation should 
show that changes in the organic composition of capital account for a 
considerable portion of the variation in the rate of profit.
lable 3j_45
REGRESSION OF RATE OF PROFIT ON 
THE ORGANIC COMPOSITION OF CAPITAL
RATE OF PROFIT
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE
BEEF SHINE
REGRESSION
COEFFICIENT
STANDARD
ERROR T-RATIO !
REGRESSION
COEFFICIENT
STANDARD
ERROR T-RATIO
INTERCEPT . 895* . 018 50.350 ! 1.159* . 029 40.188
ORG COM 235* . 009 26.365 J -. 377* .018 21.313
R2 . 951 . 927
* p (t) < . 0002
Table 3. 45 shows the results of time series regressions for the
2
rate of profit on the organic composition of capital. For both beef 
and swine production, the regression coefficients show a negative
51
relationship between the organic composition of capital ( ORG COM) and
2
the rate of profit. The R values for beef and swine are both quite
2
large. For beef production, R is 95.1% ( F( 1, 34) =659. 91 3, p<.001),
and for the swine industry, it is 92.7% ( F( 1, 34) =. 431. 765, p<.001).
The regression coefficients substantiate the Fundamentalist hypothesis
that the rate of profit declines as the organic composition of capital
increases. One can be fairly confident about these results because
they all are statistically significant beyond the .0002 level. If one
were to include the effects of the rate of exploitation (or, for that
2
matter, the effects of any other variable), R could at most increase 
5% for beef and 7% for swine production. One can reasonably conclude 
that for the red meat industry, the organic composition of capital is 
the best predictor of the rate of profit, thus supporting the third 
Fundamentalist hypothesis.
JESTS OF THE UNDERCONSDMPTIONISI HYPOTHESES
Setting aside the Fundamentalist perspective, I will now examine 
data bearing on the Underconsumptionist hypotheses. The
Qnderconsumptionist perspective argues that, other things being equal, 
the number of commodities consumed relative to investment tends to 
decrease and, consequently, the unrealized portion of absolute surplus 
value has a tendency to increase. (See Appendix A for my calculations
52
of absolute surplus value and unrealized surplus value. ) Chapter I 
offered three hypotheses Hith which to test the Underconsumptionist 
perspective. This section will examine each of those hypotheses in 
turn:
UH1: The rate of unrealized surplus value has tended to increase.
Table 3j_5
ESTIMATED RATE OF UNREALIZED SURPLUS VALUE 
BEEF PRODUCTION
CATTLE CATTLE
Year AND Year AND
CALVES CALVES
1945 21. 0% 1965 41. 2%
1946 1 7. 0% 1966 28. 1 %
1 947 1 4. 4* 1967 20. 2%
1948 24. A% 1968 16. 2%
1 949 15. 5% 1 969 12. 9%
1950 20. 0% 1 970 11.1*
1951 27. 9% 1 971 1 3. 9%
1 952 49. 5% 1 972 1 0. 7%
1953 68. 5% 1 973 1 7. 7%
1954 71. 9% 1 974 63. 6%
1 955 69. 1% 1975 73. 9%
1 956 68. 1% 1 976 68. 6%
1957 62. 2% 1977 69. 7%
1958 43. 2% 1978 41. 5%
1959 23. 6% 1979 1 5. 0%
1 960 37. 2% 1980 42. 7%
1 961 36. 3% 1981 53. 2%
1 962 34. 1 % 1982 54. 8*
1963 36. 8% 1983 58. 9%
1964 46. 1 %
3 3  S S S S 3  25 S 3 3  3  SS SS 3  3  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  3 3 3 3 5 3 3
SOURCE: see Tables A2.13 and A2.2
RA
TE
 
OF
 
UN
RE
AL
IZ
ED
 
SU
RP
LU
S 
VA
LU
E 
RA
TE
 
OF
 
UN
RE
AL
IZ
ED
 
SU
RP
LU
S 
VA
LU
E
BOX
FIGURE 3.51 BEEF ESTIMATES
70X  -
BOX -
SOX -
40%
30%
I f ' T " l T" T T" 1 1 I 'I 1 T I I | ( - T - j - T - r - T  ■ | . - j f— ......f— r  , - r  , ,
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983
YEAR
FIGURE 3 .5Z  BEEF TREND
40% -
20%
15%
1955 1970 1975 1980 19831950 1965
YEAR
54
ESTIMATED RATE OF UNREALIZED SURPLUS VALUE 
SHINE PRODUCTION
Year
HOGS
AND
PIGS
Year
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1 945 44. 356 1965 56. 956
1946 40. 956 1966 45. 0%
1947 41. 256 1967 62. 0%
1 948 52. 6% 1968 64. 3%
1 949 60. 2% 1969 51. 7%
1 950 66. 5% 1970 61. 7%
1951 68. 8% 1 971 72. 9%
1952 70. 7% 1972 55. 2%
1953 51. 4% 1973 46. 6%
1954 55. 2% 1974 67. 5%
1955 71. 4% 1975 35. 256
1956 71. 8% 1976 46. 056
1957 64. 1 56 1977 59. 7%
1958 61. 6J6 1978 49. 956
1 959 76. 6% 1979 67. 956
1960 71. 3% 1980 75. 456
1 961 67. 5% 1981 66. 7%
1962 70. 5% 1 982 47. 3%
1963 74. 5J6 1 983 61. 056
1964 71. 8%
SOURCE: see Tables A2.13 and A2.2
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For beef production, the rate of unrealized surplus value has 
varied considerably, without a consistent trend. Table 3. 5 and Figure
3.51 show that it has fluctuated within a broad range (10% to 74%).
Figure 3. 52 seems to show a cycle rather than an increasing trend. 
Overall, beef production data do not support the hypothesis that the 
rate of unrealized surplus value has increased.
Analysis of the rate of unrealized surplus value for swine 
production show variation like that for beef. Table 3.6 and Figure 
3.61 show a considerable range for the rate of unrealized surplus 
value (35% to 77%). Although Figure 3.62 indicates an increasing
trend from 1945 to about 1960, the rate of unrealized surplus value
has since declined. In short, swine production data fail to 
substantiate the'first Underconsumptionist hypothesis.
To test the second Underconsumptionist hypothesis, one needs to 
determine the relationship between the consumption/investment ratio 
and the rate of unrealized surplus value.
UH2: Holding constant the effects of the output/investment ratio, 
direct state payments to the farm sector, and the utilization 
of productive capacity, there will be a negative relationship 
between the consumption/investment ratio and the rate of 
unrealized surplus value.
57
lafcle 3j_Z
REGRESSION OF RATE OF UNREALIZED SURPLUS VALUE ON 
FOUR UNDERCONSUMPTIONIST VARIABLES
RATE OF UNREALIZED SURPLUS VALUE
BEEF SHINE
INDEPENDENT REGRESSION 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT
STANDARD 
ERROR T-RATIO
REGRESSION STANDARD 
COEFFICIENT ERROR T-RATIO
INTERCEPT . 102 . 1 89 . 536 .386*** .145 2. 664
OUT/INV -30. 617 61. 321 -. 499 -13.631**** 7.268 -1.876
GOV PAY -. 051 . 036 -1.439 -.019 .016 -1 . 1 98
UTL PCAP -. 006 . 019 -. 319 .008** .003 2. 930
CON/INV 63. 892 49. 191 1. 299 23.712* 6.292 3. 768
R2 . 229 . 607
* p ( t) 
** p (t)
< .0007
< . 007
*** p ( t) 
**** p ( t)
< .012 
< . 07
Table 3.7 shows the results of time series regressions for the
rate of unrealized surplus value on four Underconsumptionist
variables- -the output/investment ratio (OUT/INV), direct state
payments to the farm sector ( GOV PAY) , utilization of production
3
capacity (UTL PCAP), and the consumption/investment ratio (CON/INV). 
For beef production, none of the parameters has a statistically 
significant effect. All together they account for less than 25% of 
the variation in the rate of unrealized surplus value (F(3,31)=3.069, 
p<.05). The regression coefficient for the consumption/investment 
ratio indicates a positive relationship between that variable and the 
rate of unrealized surplus value, thereby contradicting the second
58
Underconsumptionist hypothesis. These results clearly fail to support
the second Underconsumptionist hypothesis.
2
For swine production, R indicates that 60. 7% of the variation in
the rate of surplus value can be explained by changes in the four
independent variables, F( 3, 31) =15. 960, p<.001 (Table 3.7). The
regression coefficient for the consumption/investment ratio indicates
a positive and significant relationship between that variable and the
rate of unrealized surplus value, thus contradicting the second
2
Underconsumptionist hypothesis. Despite the large R , these results 
do not support the hypothesis that decreasing consumption/investment 
ratios lead to increasing rates of unrealized surplus value.
The third Underconsumptionist hypothesis predicts that increased
rates of unrealized surplus value lead to decreased rates of profit. 
Re will specifically test:
UH3: Holding constant the effects of the output/investment ratio,
direct state payments to the farm sector, the utilization of 
productive capacity, and the consumption/investment ratio, 
there will be a negative relationship between the rate of 
unrealized surplus value and the rate of profit.
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Table 3^8
REGRESSION OF RATE OF PROFIT ON 
FIVE UNDERCONSUMPTIONIST VARIABLES
RATE OF PROFIT
BEEF SHINE
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE
REGRESSION
COEFFICIENT
STANDARD
ERROR T-RATI0
REGRESSION
COEFFICIENT
STANDARD 
ERROR T-RATIO
INTERCEPT . 288* . 050 5. 752 . 571 * .117 4. 892
OUT/INV 4. 470 1 5. 967 . 280 6. 61 7 5. 61 4 1. 1 79
GOV PAY .023** . 011 2. 091 -. 01 5 . 012 -1.336
UTL PCAP -. 006 . 004 -1. 300 . 001 . 002 . 370
CON/INV -12. 061 1 3. 755 -. 877 9.871*** 5. 574 1. 771
RUSV -. 082*** . 046 -1.806 -. 924* . 1 28 -7.224
R2 . 384 . 677
* p ( t) < . 0002 *** p (t) < . 09
p ( t) < .05
Table 3. 8 shows the results of time series regressions for the 
rate of profit on five variables— the four independent variables from 
Table 3.7 plus the rate of unrealized surplus value (RUSV). For beef 
production, 38. 4% of the variation in the rate of profit can be 
accounted for by changes in the five variables ( F( 4, 30)=4.675, p<.01). 
The rate of unrealized surplus value does show a negative relationship 
with the rate of profit, as predicted. For the case of beef 
production, this test supports the third Underconsumptionist 
hypothesis.
For swine production, 67. 7% of the variation in the rate of
60
profit can be explained by changes in the independent variables, 
F( 4, 30) =1 5. 720, p<.001 (Table 3.8). The regression coefficient for
the rate of unrealized surplus value indicates a negative and strongly 
significant relationship (p(t)<.0002) with the rate of profit, as 
predicted by the third Underconsumptionist hypothesis.
These results could lead one to conclude that Underconsumptionist 
theorists have not identified the best predictors of the rate of 
unrealized surplus value, but have adequately explained the 
relationship between the rate of unrealized surplus value and the rate 
of profit. Our analyses for beef production also support such a 
conclusion. If Underconsumptionists have not identified the best 
predictors of the rate of unrealized surplus value, what would be a 
better predictor? Proponents of the Fundamentalist perspective would 
answer that Underconsumptionists misinterpret the causal relationship 
between the rate of unrealized surplus value and the rate of profit. 
Fundamentalists maintain that rather than the rate of unrealized 
surplus value influencing the rate of profit, the rate of profit 
actually determines the rate of unrealized surplus value. Hence, 
Fundamentalists argue that the rate of profit is the best predictor of 
the rate of unrealized surplus value (Cogoy,1973:64 cited in 
Hright, 1977: 212). If true, the rate of profit should significantly 
enhances our ability to predict the rate of unrealized surplus value, 
thus contradicting Underconsumptionist theory. The next section takes 
up this issue.
61
Te s t i n g  t h e  t h e o r i e s  a g a i n s t  ONE ANOTHER
Proponents of the Fundamentalist approach have suggested a 
critical test by arguing that a falling rate of profit causes 
increases in the rate of unrealized surplus value. If the rate of 
profit significantly enhances our ability to predict the rate of 
unrealized surplus value, this would apparently substantiate the 
Fundamentalist claim and contradict Underconsumptionist theory.
However, because determining causal relationships is primarily a 
matter of theoretical interpretation, empirical criteria alone should 
not lead us to conclude that Underconsumptionist theory is wrong. 
Empirical evidence can support but never prove a particular 
theoretical position. This section explores the possibility that the 
lack of empirical support for the Underconsumptionist hypotheses is 
due to their misinterpretation of the relationship between the rate of 
profit and the rate of unrealized surplus value. Specifically:
Test 1: Holding constant the effects of the output/investment
ratio, direct state payments to the farm sector, 
utilization of productive capacity, and the
consumption/investment ratio, there will be a negative 
relationship between the rate of profit and the rate of 
unrealized surplus value.
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lafele 3^9
REGRESSION OF RATE OF UNREALIZED SURPLUS VALUE ON
FIVE VARIABLES
RATE OF UNREALIZED SURPLUS VALUE
BEEF SHINE
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE
REGRESSION
COEFFICIENT
STANDARD
ERROR T-RATIO
REGRESSION
COEFFICIENT
STANDARD
ERROR T-RATIO
INTERCEPT . 363****** . 209 1. 738 . 496* . 088 5. 626
OUT/INV -55.344 58.393 -. 948 . 623 4. 71 0 . 1 32
GOV PAY -. 033 . 034 -. 958 -.016***** . 009 -1. 819
UTL PCAP -. 009 . 018 488 . 003***** . 002 1. 849
CON/INV 104.212**** 48. 870 2. 132 1 4. 933** 4. 1 61 3. 589
ROP -1.085** . 442 -2.452 -. 667* . 087 -7.664
R2 353 . 844
* p (t) < .0002 **** p ( t) < .05
** p (t) < . 002 ***** p (t) < .08
*** p ( t) < .02 ****** p ( t) < .1
Table 3. 9 shoas the results for the rate of unrealized surplus
value on the four Underconsumptionist variables— (OUT/INV), (GOV PAY),
(UTL PCAP), and ( CON/INV)— and the rate of profit ( ROP). For beef 
2
production, R suggests that 35. 3% of the variation in the rate of 
unrealized surplus value can be accounted for by changes in the five 
variables, F(4,30)=4.092, p<.01. The rate of profit has a significant 
negative impact on the rate of unrealized surplus value, as predicted. 
Beef production data support the hypothesis that decreased rates of 
profit lead to increased rates of unrealized surplus value.
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For swine production, R shows that 84. 4% of the variation in the
rate of surplus value can be explained by changes in the five
variables, F( 4, 30) =40. 577, p<.001. (Table 3.9). As the "Test 1"
hypothesis predicts, the regression coefficient for the rate of 
profit is negative and significant. The data for swine production 
strongly support the "Test 1" hypothesis.
By itself, empirical verification of the "Test 1" hypothesis does 
not necessarily prove the rate of profit significantly enhances our 
ability to predict the rate of unrealized surplus value. Before we 
can reach such a conclusion, we must statistically test this 
hypothesis:
Test 2: Rhen taking account of the rate of profit (Test 1
hypothesis), our ability to predict the rate of unrealized 
surplus value is significantly greater than when we do not 
take account of the rate of profit (the second
Underconsumptionist hypothesis).
"Test 2" essentially predicts that adding the rate of profit to the
2
UH2 regression equation will significantly increase R .
2
For beef production, R without the rate of profit (UH2) is 22.9%
2
(Table 3.7); with the rate of profit ("Test 1") R is 35.3% (Table
2
3.9). For swine production, R without the rate of profit is 60.7%
(Table 3.7); with the rate of profit it is 84.4% (Table 3.9). For
2
beef production, F for the significance of the difference of R 's is 
F( 1, 32)=6.132, p<. 05, and for swine production, it is 
F(1,32)=48.165, p<.001. Basing my judgment on F tests for the
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difference of R ' s, I conclude that the rate of profit significantly 
enhances our ability to predict the rate of unrealized surplus value 
for both beef and swine production.
CONCLUSIONS
My project here has empirically compared two competing and 
contradictory Marxian crisis theories with the goal of determining 
which theory best explains empirical trends in the red meat industry. 
To accomplish this, I identified and tested several hypotheses for 
each perspective. Hhat have the results from these tests shown?
The evidence fails to verify the Fundamentalist approach for the 
case of beef production. For the hypothesis that the organic 
composition of capital has tended to increase, the data showed less 
than a 10 percent increase from 1945 to 1983. Thus, beef production
data only weakly supported this hypothesis. For the swine industry,
the fit of the data and Fundamentalist theory is much better, with 
approximately a 70 percent increase in the organic composition of 
capital from 1945 to 1983. By contrast to the beef industry, swine
production data strongly supported the first Fundamentalist
hypothesis.
Testing the Fundamentalist hypothesis that the rate of profit has 
tended to decline, I found that the rate of profit varied only 
slightly for beef production, rising about 2 percent from 1945 to 
1983. Although beef production data generally did not support a 
declining rate of profit hypothesis, swine production data did. For
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swine production, the rate of profit clearly decreased, dropping about 
38 percent from 1945 to 1983.
The third Fundamentalist hypothesis was that the organic
composition of capital, rather than the rate of exploitation, is the
principal determinant of the rate of profit. For both beef and swine
production, a time series regression of the rate of profit on the
organic composition of capital showed strong and significant negative
2 2 
relationships (Beef: R =.95, p(F)<.001; Swine: R =.93, p(F)<.001).
Both industries' data strongly supported the third Fundamentalist
hypothesis.
Except for this last hypothesis, tests of the Fundamentalist 
hypotheses have produced mixed results. Beef production data strongly 
supported only the third Fundamentalist hypothesis, while data for the 
swine industry supported all three hypotheses. Overall, the analysis 
suggests that the Fundamentalist perspective adequately accounts for 
swine production trends, but is not satisfactory for beef production.
Reviewing the tests of the three Underconsumptionist hypotheses, 
we find that the Underconsumptionist approach received little 
empirical support. For both beef and swine production, the rate of 
unrealized surplus value has varied considerably, without consistent 
trend. Neither industry's data supported the first
Underconsumptionist hypothesis that the rate of unrealized surplus 
value has tended to increase.
Similarly, the second Underconsumptionist hypothesis, which 
posited a negative relationship between the consumption/investment 
ratio and the rate of unrealized surplus value, was not supported by
6 6
beef or swine production data. For both beef and swine production a
time series regression showed that the relationship between the
consumption/investment ratio and the rate of unrealized surplus value
2 2 
was positive and significant (Beef: R =.229, p(F)<.05; Swine: R =.607,
p(F)<.001), thus contradicting the Underconsumptionist prediction of a
negative relationship between those two variables.
The third Underconsumptionist hypothesis suggested a negative
relationship between the rate of unrealized surplus value and the rate
of profit. Beef production data did show a negative relationship 
2 2 
(R =. 384, pCFX.01)-, as did swine production data (R =.677,
p( F) <. 001).
Similar to the tests of the Fundamentalist hypotheses, tests of 
the Underconsumptionist hypotheses produced mixed results. For both
beef and swine production, Underconsumptionist theory failed to
account for trends in the rate of unrealized surplus value, but 
correctly predicted the relationship between the rate of unrealized 
surplus value and the rate of profit. I noted that proponents of the
Fundamentalist perspective would argue that Underconsumptionists have 
misinterpreted the causal relationship between the rate of unrealized 
surplus value and the rate of profit. Fundamentalists maintain that
rather than the rate of unrealized surplus value determining the rate 
of profit, the rate of profit determines the rate of unrealized
surplus value, thus making the rate of profit the best predictor of 
the rate of unrealized surplus value (Cogoy,1973:64 cited in
Hright, 1977: 212).
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To test this claim, I compared a regression of the rate of
unrealized surplus value on four Underconsumptionist variables to a
regression of the rate of unrealized surplus value on the rate of
profit and the four Underconsumptionist variables. For beef
2 2
production, the difference between R ' s was .12 (R with the rate of
2
profit was .35 and R without the rate of profit was .23). For swine
2
production, the difference was . 23 (R with the rate of profit was .84 
2
and R without the rate of profit was .61). For both beef and swine
2
production, this difference in R ' s was significant (Beef: 
F( 1, 32) =6. 1 32, p<.05; Swine: F( 1, 32) =48. 1 65, p<.001), suggesting that
the rate of profit significantly enhances our ability to predict the 
rate of unrealized surplus value. These results fit the 
Fundamentalist perspective better than the Underconsumptionist 
approach.
Overall, the Fundamentalist perspective received more empirical 
support than the Underconsumptionist approach. Beef production data 
supported two of the three Fundamentalist hypotheses, while swine
production data supported all three. I also found that for both the 
beef and swine industries, the rate of profit significantly enhanced 
our ability to predict the rate of unrealized surplus value, thus
supporting the Fundamentalist perspective. Of the eight
Fundamentalist hypotheses, seven were supported by the data. For the 
Underconsumptionist approach, beef and swine production data supported 
only two of the six hypotheses. Basing my Judgment on this tally, I 
conclude that the Fundamentalist perspective best explains empirical 
trends in the red meat industry. However, even the Fundamentalist
6 8
perspective does not completely account for the data, as evidenced by 
the increase in the beef industry’s rate of profit from 1945 to 1983.
Hhat could possibly explain the mixed results for the 
Fundamentalist perspective and the almost complete lack of empirical 
support for the Underconsumptionist approach? One could answer that 
the theories are simply inadequate. However, declaring the theories 
inadequate on the basis of a single study would be a premature and 
dubious conclusion. A more critical and productive answer would 
examine how flaws in the research design might account for the 
results. Developing an error analysis of my research, I will examine 
two issues: 1) whether the data adequately measure the central
concepts; and, 2) whether the red meat industry since 1945 is outside 
the scope of either theory.
Taking the validity issue first, consider what would have 
occurred if (for example) my indicators of unrealized surplus value 
did not really measure unrealized surplus value. If so, the
relationships between the rate of unrealized surplus value and other 
variables— e. g. the consumption/investment ratio, rate of profit, 
etc. — could differ dramatically from Underconsumptionist predictions. 
If my measures failed to capture all components of unrealized surplus 
value, it would have led to a consistent underestimate. This error 
would work against all of the Underconsumptionist hypotheses, because 
underestimating unrealized surplus value would hide crisis tendencies. 
Clearly, invalid measures of a single key concept would invalidate the 
empirical tests themselves.
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Another potentially biasing data problem derives from 
apportioning production costs on the basis of market revenues. 
Perhaps one should take account of how efficiently animals convert 
feed to meat when allocating feed costs, rather than apportioning 
costs according to shares of market revenues. Cattle convert feed to 
meat less efficiently than other livestock (Lappe, 1982: 69-71 ), so that 
beef production may actually incur a larger share of feed costs than 
what its share of market revenues would indicate. If so, apportioning 
feed costs on a revenue basis underestimates beef production costs, 
thereby inflating the rate of profit and hiding crisis tendencies in 
the beef meat industry. For the swine industry, because hogs and pigs 
convert feed to meat more efficiently than beef cattle, apportioning 
feed costs on a revenue basis might overestimate production costs, 
thereby exaggerating crisis tendencies. This would explain the 
absence of a declining rate of profit for beef production and the 
falling rate of profit for swine production. For the beef industry, 
apportioning costs on the basis of revenues might therefore have 
worked against the Fundamentalist perspective, while those procedures 
might have worked in favor of Fundamentalist theory in the case of 
swine production. Either one of these possibilities could account for 
the mixed results associated with the Fundamentalist approach.
The difficulties of allocating production costs is related to the 
broader problem of using aggregate data. Suppose that, for whatever 
reason, the majority of red meat producers experienced crisis while 
the rest of the industry enjoyed qreat economic success, so that 
monetary gains on the whole outweighed losses. A minority of larger
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producers could have been successful enough to outweigh, in the 
aggregate, the failures of smaller producers. Aggregate data could 
thus conceal crisis tendencies, thus explaining why neither theory 
consistently fit the data.
The "scope issue" concerns whether applying manufacturing crisis 
theories to an agricultural industry constitutes an unfair empirical 
test. Agriculture uses less waged labor, depends more upon direct 
federal assistance in the form of price supports, and is more 
dependent on non-economic factors (e. g. weather conditions) than 
traditional manufacturing industries. These dissimilarities suggest 
that economic crisis in agriculture might require a separate theory. 
If the red meat industry does not typify capitalist industry as 
presumed by both theories, expecting Fundamentalist and 
Underconsumptionist variables to behave as predicted would be 
unreasonable. Explaining agricultural trends might require taking 
into account non-economic variables such as weather. Considering 
weather, we might find that breeding stock die during severe weather, 
thereby reducing the number of animals born during the year, 
decreasing the number of unsold animals, restricting demand so that 
beef and swine sell for more than their value, and, thus, retarding 
underconsumption tendencies.
One might also argue that the red meat industry is outside the 
scope of the Fundamentalist and Underconsumptionist perspectives 
because conjunctural effects have overridden the basic structural 
processes posited by both theories. Mandel (1975) argues that 1946 to
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1966 was a period of general economic expansion for the United States 
and that agriculture continued to prosper until the end of the Vietnam 
Har (see also Kiser and Drass,1987: 287-289). The demand generated by 
the post-Horld Har II and Vietnam booms would have kept profits high, 
thus suppressing crisis tendencies in the red meat industry. This 
possibility has some empirical support because depressed rates of 
profit for the red meat industry in the 1970*s coincide with the end 
of the Vietnam war and a general U. S. economic slump 
(Mandel, 1975; 1978). The fit between both theories and red meat 
industry data might have been better if not for exceptional historical 
circumstances from 1945 to 1983.
The red meat industry might be atypical because of dramatic 
structural change since 1945. Hhile the red meat industry of the 
1940s consisted of a multitude of small producers, the development of 
feed lot production and the rise of agribusiness have increasingly 
concentrated this industry (Mason and Singer, 1980: 97-111). Hright 
(1977) has theorized more generally about such a situation. He 
suggests that competitive capitalist enterprises tend to suffer from 
crises associated with declining rates of profit, while monopoly 
capitalism usually experiences crises of underconsumption. If 1945 to 
1983 represented a transitional phase for the red meat industry, 
during which part of the industry was competitive and part was 
becoming monopolistic, neither theory could adequately explain the 
economic trends for the entire period. The two contradictory forms of 
crisis might then account for the mixed results of this study.
7 2
Overall, the empirical evidence presented here supported the 
Fundamentalist perspective rather than the Underconsumptionist 
approach. However, the absence of a declining rate of profit for the 
beef industry means that even the Fundamentalist perspective did not 
consistently explain the economic trends in the red meat industry. 
The preceding explanations of this study* s mixed results suggest some 
possibilities for future research. Given the enduring significance of 
food production and its particular importance to capitalism, current 
Marxian theories' failure to explain agricultural economic crises is 
serious. As a remedy, Marxian theorists should develop a theory of 
the causes and consequences of agricultural crisis as a unique and 
central form of capitalist production. Fundamentalists and 
Underconsumptionists alike should focus on how competitive and 
monopoly agriculture affect economic trends. Such work should also 
pay special attention to historical circumstances that might affect 
key crisis indicators (e. g. the effect wars have upon the rate of 
profit or the rate of unrealized surplus value). In terms of future 
empirical research, data which is not aggregated would improve our 
picture of economic trends. In conclusion, this study alone does not 
warrant the dismissal of either theory, but it has pointed out some 
problems associated with the Fundamentalist and Underconsumptionist 
theories which require further revision, rethinking, and empirical 
testing.
a p p e n d i x  a
Using 1960 data, this appendix illustrates the estimating 
procedures, and makes data that was not presented in the text 
accessible to interested readers.
All of the calculations in this appendix and in the text use 
figures expressed in 1967 dollars, thereby controlling for the effects 
of inflation. Table A. 1 lists the price indexes and deflators used to 
convert current dollars into constant 1967 dollars (Economic R§BQ£t of 
the President, 1986). (All tables are presented at the end of the 
appendix, for the sake of convenience.) Because 1957 is the first 
year that an "energy" index is given, some other index had to be used 
for earlier years. For the years 1945 to 1956, the consumer price 
index for "all items" was used. Such a makeshift index should not 
adversely affect my estimates because energy costs are more 
significant after 1957. The producer price index of "total farm 
products" was used to convert cash market receipts and farm slaughter 
values into 1967 dollars (Table A. 31 and A. 32 respectively); for feed 
costs, the producer price index of "farm foods and feeds" was 
employed; the producer price index of "other farm products" was used 
for livestock costs; for trucks and tractors, the "durable equipment" 
GNP fixed investment deflator was used; for service buildings, the 
"structures" GNP fixed investment deflator was used; and, the "total" 
GNP price deflator was used for overhead, land, and labor costs (Table 
A. 2). (The primary data source for farm sector costs and revenues is 
Lucier, et al.,1986.) My calculations used the producer price index
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for "total farm products" to convert the alternative (JSDA estimates of 
total production costs into 1967 dollars (Agricultural Statistics).
Following the presentation in Chapter II, we will first 
illustrate the computations for the empirical indicators of constant 
capital. For the first indicator of constant capital, feed, the 
formula
Feed Costs for Red Meat Animals 
= Feed Costs for the Entire Farm Sector
* (Cash Market Receipts from Red Meat Animals
Cash Market Receipts from All Livestock)
was used to determine what portion of feed costs for the entire farm 
sector belongs to beef and swine production. (The cash market 
receipts from all livestock include cattle, calves, hogs, pigs, sheep, 
lambs, poultry and eggs, dairy products, wool, and revenues from all 
other livestock.) Hence, the 1960 cost of feed in millions of 1967 
dollars for beef production is $1,977 ($5,086 times $7,876 divided by 
$20, 266); and, for swine, .it is $768 ($5,086 tiroes $3,062 divided by 
$20, 266) ( Table A. 4).
The next economic indicator presented is the cost of livestock. . 
To determine what portion of livestock costs for the entire farm 
sector belongs to the red meat industry the following formula was 
used:
Livestock Costs for Red Meat Animals 
= Livestock Costs for the Entire Farm Sector
* ( Cash Market Receipts from Red Meat Animals
/ Cash Market Receipts from All Livestock)
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Thus, the 1960 cost of livestock in millions of 1967 dollars for beef 
is $1,002 ($2,578 times $7,876 divided by $20,266); and, for swine 
production, it is $390 ($2,578 times $3,062 divided by $20,266) (Table 
A.5). (The figures may not sum due to rounding error. The figures in 
the Tables are more precise.)
To estimate energy costs for red meat animal production, this 
formula was used:
Energy Costs for Red Meat Animals
= Energy Costs for the Entire Farm Sector
* (Cash Market Receipts from Red Meat Animals
/ Cash Market Receipts from All Farm Commodities)
The 1960 cost of energy in millions of 1967 dollars for beef 
production is $383 ($1,763 times $7,876 divided by $36,299); and, for 
swine, it is $149 ($1,763 times $3,062 divided by $36,299) (Table 
A. 6).
For machinery costs, the formula
Machinery Costs for Red Meat Animals
= Tractor and Truck Costs for the Entire Farm Sector
* (Cash Market Receipts from Red Meat Animals
/ Cash Market Receipts from All Farm Commodities)
was used to determine what portion of tractor and truck costs for the
entire farm sector belongs to the red meat industry. Hence, the 1960
cost of machinery in millions of 1967 dollars for beef production is 
$216 ($997 times $7,876 divided by $36,299); and, swine production, it 
is $84 ($997 times $3,062 divided by $36,299) (Table A.7).
To estimate structure costs for red meat animal production, this
formula was used:
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Structure Costs for Swine Production
= Service Building Costs for the Entire Farm Sector
* (Cash Market Receipts from Swine
/ Cash Market Receipts from All Farm Commodities)
As mentioned in Chapter II, the costs of structures for beef 
production are assumed to be negligible, thus we calculate those costs 
only for swine production. The 1960 cost of structures in millions of 
1967 dollars for swine production is $117 ($1,387 times $3,062 divided 
by $36, 299) (Table A. 8) .
To calculate overhead costs for the red meat industry, we made 
the distinction between those overhead costs which belong to all farm 
production and those which belong to livestock production. The 
following formula was used to determine what portion of general 
overhead belongs to the red meat industry:
Veterinary and Livestock Marketing Costs 
for the Entire Farm Sector
* (Cash Market Receipts from Red Meat Animals
/ Cash Market Receipts from All Livestock Production)
Hence, the 1960 cost of general overhead in millions of 1967 dollars 
for beef production is $882 ($4,065 times $7,876 divided by $36,299); 
and, for swine production, it is $343 ($4,065 times $3,062 divided by 
$36,299). To determine what portion of livestock overhead belongs to 
the red meat industry, we used this formula:
Repairs, Operations, Telephone, and Other Miscellaneous
Costs for the Entire Farm Sector 
* (Cash Market Receipts from Red Meat Animals 
/ Cash Market Receipts from All Farm Commodities
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Thus* the 1960 cost of livestock overhead in millions of 1967 dollars 
for beef production is $191 ($491 times $7,876 divided by $20*266); 
and, for swine production* it is $74 ($491 times $3,062 divided by 
$20*266). Adding the general and livestock overheads yields the total 
overhead. For beef production, the 1960 total overhead is $1,073; 
and, for swine production, it is $417 (Table A. 9).
Because we assumed that land costs for swine production are 
negligible, we estimated those costs only for beef production. 
Estimating the land costs for beef production, we used this formula:
Land Costs for Beef Production
« Land Costs for the Entire Farm Sector
* (Acres of Private Pasture and Grassland
/ Acres of All Farmland)
* (Average value of an Acre Used for Grazing Livestock
/ Average value of an Acre Used for All Farm Production)
* (Cash Market Receipts from Cattle and Calves
Cash Market Receipts from All Grazing Livestock)
(Receipts from all grazing livestock include cattle, calves, sheep, 
lambs, dairy, and wool revenues. ) As we noted in Chapter II, the 
ratio of the average value of an acre used for grazing livestock 
divided by the average value of an acre used for all farm production 
is set at 60%. Table A1.01 shows the ratios of acres of private 
pasture and grassland divided by acres of all farmland. Land 
utilization data are known for the years 1940, 1950, 1959, 1969, 1974,
1978, 1982; the figures for the remaining years are projections based
on the known data (Agricultural Statistics, 1985: 372). The 1960 cost
of land in millions of 1967 dollars for beef production is $413
($3,811 times 30.8% times 60% times the ratio of $7,876 divided by
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$1 3, 41 8) ( Table A1. 02).
In addition to constant capital expenditures, variable capital is 
the other major production cost. To estimate variable capital this 
formula was used:
Hired Labor Costs for Red Meat Animals 
= (Hired Labor Costs for the Entire Farm Sector 
/ Total Farm Labor Hours)
* Hours Spent raising Meat Animals
* (Cash Market Receipts from Red Meat Animals 
/ Cash Market Receipts from Meat Animals)
(Meat animals include cattle, calves, hogs, pigs, sheep, and lambs.) 
Table A1.11 shows the data for total farm labor hours and the time 
spent raising meat animals. The 1960 expenditures for hired labor in 
millions of 1967 dollars for beef production is $331 ($3,559 divided 
by 9,795 millions of farm labor hours times 1,307 millions of hours 
raising meat animals times $7,876 divided by $11,285); and, for swine 
production, it is $129 ($3,559 divided by 9,795 millions of farm labor 
hours times 1,307 millions of hours raising meat animals times $3,062 
divided by $11, 285) (Table A1.12).
Summing constant plus variable capital yields total production 
costs. The estimated 1960 total production costs in millions of 1967 
dollars for beef production is $5, 395; and, for swine production, it 
is $2,054 (Tables A1.21 and A1.22). Subtracting total production
costs from cash market receipts and the value of farm slaughter for 
red meat animals (Table A. 31 and A.32) leaves surplus value. 
Estimated 1960 surplus value in millions of 1967 dollars for beef 
production is $2,647 ($7,876 plus $166 minus $5,395); and, for swine
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production, it is $1, 203 ($3, 062 plus $195 minus $2, 054) (Table A1.3).
To estimate the organic composition of capital, He divided 
constant capital by the sum of surplus value and variable capital. 
The estimated 1960 organic composition of capital for beef production 
is 1.70 ($5, 064 divided by $2, 647 plus $331); and, for snine, it is 
1.44 ($1,925 divided by $1,203 plus $129) (see Chapter III, Tables 3.1 
and 3. 2) .
Dividing surplus value by the sum of constant plus variable
capital produces the rate of profit. The estimated 1960 rate of
profit for beef production is 49.1% ($2,647 divided by $5,395); and, 
for snine production, it is 58.6% ($1,203 divided by $2, 054) (see 
Chapter III, Tables 3.3 and 3.4).
Dividing surplus value by variable capital yields the rate of
exploitation. The 1960 estimated rate of exploitation for beef 
production is 800% ($2,647 divided by $331); and, for snine
production, it is 933% ( $1, 203 divided by $129) (Table A1.4).
To compute unrealized surplus value, He imputed prices for red 
meat animals unsold and for those xhich Here sold belon their value. 
The imputed price-value of beef overproduction Has estimated nith this 
formula:
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Imputed Price For Unsold Beef 
= (Total Beef Inventory as of January 1 
+ Cattle Shipped In During the Year 
+ Calves Born During the Year ('*calf crop”)
Cattle and Calves that Die During the Year 
Following Year's Inventory of Milk Cows < this includes
milk cows and milk c o m replacements) 
Cattle Other than Beef Cattle
Following Year's Necessary Inventory (includes bulls
and other "stocker cattle”) 
Calves Not Ready for Market (this includes oalves
under 500 pounds)
Cattle and Calves Marketed 
- Cattle and Calves Slaughtered for Farm Consumption)
* The greatest price received per head from 1945 up to and 
including the year in question which is calculated as 
The Number of Cattle and Calves Marketed
and Slaughtered for Farm Consumption 
/ "Gross Income" for Beef Production
(see Tables A1. 5 through A2.11). The 1960 estimate of beef 
overproduction is 3, 208, 000 ( 96,236, 000 plus 5, 903, 000 plus 39, 355, 000 
minus 4,100,000 minus 29, 733,000 minus 56,970,000 minus 46, 288, 000 
minus 1, 195,000) (Table A1.9). Multiplying this total by $189.66 (the 
highest price received per head of beef from 1945 up to and including 
1960— Table A2.0) produces $608,000,000— the imputed price for 1960 
unsold beef (Table A2.11).
The difference between full price-value and actual revenue for
cattle and calves was estimated using this formula:
Full Price-Value Less Actual Beef Revenues 
= The greatest price received per head from 1945 
up to and including the year in question which is 
calculated as 
The Number of Cattle and Calves Marketed
and Slaughtered for Farm Consumption 
/ "Gross Income" for Beef Production 
* The Number of Cattle and Calves Marketed and 
Slaughtered for Farm Consumption 
- "Gross Income" for Beef (Market Receipts plus Farm 
Slaughter— Tables A. 31 and A. 32)
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The 1960 estimated difference between full price-value and actual 
revenues received for beef production is $963,000,000 ([$189.66
multiplied by 47, 483, 000] minus $8, 042,000, 000) (Table A2. 12). Adding 
this to the imputed price for unsold beef produces $1,571,000,000—  
estimated unreali2ed surplus value (Table A2.13). For beef 
production, the sum of unrealized surplus value and surplus value 
equals $4, 219,000,000— absolute surplus value (Table A2. 2). Dividing 
unrealized surplus value by absolute surplus value equals 37. 2%— the 
rate of unrealized surplus value (see Chapter III, Table 3.5).
For swine production, the imputed price-value of overproduction 
was estimated with this formula:
Imputed Price for Unsold Swine 
= (Total Swine Inventory as of January 1 
+ Pigs Born During the Year (*'pig crop”)
Hogs that Die During the Year
- Following Year’s Necessary Inventory ("stocker swine”
which includes sows farrowing plus boars which are 
estimated as 5% of the number of sows farrowing)
- Pigs Not Ready for Market (this includes five sixths
of the pigs born after June 1 
Hogs and Pigs Marketed
- Hogs and Pigs Slaughtered for Farm Consumption)
* The greatest price received per swine from 1945 up to
and including the year in question which is calculated as 
The Number of Hogs and Pigs Marketed
and Slaughtered for Farm Consumption 
/ "Gross Income” for Swine Production
(see Tables A1. 5 through A2.11). Chapter II noted that the number of 
pigs that die during the year is estimated by multiplying the total 
pig crop by a certain percentage. For 1960, the percentage is 1.3%. 
Hence, the 1960 estimated overproduction for swine equals 13,485,000
(59,087,000 plus 88, 216,000 minus 1,147,000 minus 47,726,000
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(necessary inventory and the number of pigs not ready for market) 
minus 79, 831, 000 minus 5,114,000 (Table A1.9). Multiplying this total 
by $63.45 (the greatest price received per swine from 1945 up to and 
including 1960— Table A2. 0) produces $856,000, 000— the imputed price 
for 1960 unsold swine (Table A2.11).
The difference between full price-value and actual revenue for 
hogs and pigs was estimated using this formula:
Full Price-Value Less Actual Swine Revenues 
= The greatest price received per swine from 1945 
up to and including the year in question which is 
calculated as 
The Number of Hogs and Pigs Marketed
and Slaughtered for Farm Consumption 
/ "Gross Income" for Swine Production 
* The Number of Hogs and Pigs Marketed and
Slaughtered for Farm Consumption 
"Gross Income" for Swine (Market Receipts plus Farm 
Slaughter— Tables A.31 and A. 32)
The 1960 estimated difference between full price-value and actual 
revenues received for swine production is $2,133,000,000 (($63.45
multiplied by 84, 945, 000) minus $3,257,000,000) (Table A2. 12). Adding 
this to the imputed price for unsold swine produces $2,989,000,000—  
estimated unrealized surplus value (Table A2.13). For swine 
production, the sum of unrealized surplus value and surplus value 
equals $4,192, 000, 000— absolute surplus value (Table A2. 2). Dividing 
unrealized surplus value by absolute surplus value equals 71.3%— the 
rate of unrealized surplus value (see Chapter III, Table 3.6).
To estimate output/investment ratios the following formula was
used:
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Output/Investment Ratio
- Number of Red Meat Animals Born During the Year 
/ Constant and Variable Capital
For beef production, the estimated 1960 output/investment ratio is
( 88, 216, 000 divided by $2,054,000,000) (Table A2. 3).
To compute consumption/investment ratios this formula Has used:
Consumption/Investment Ratio 
= Red Meat Animals Marketed
+ Red Meat Animals Slaughtered for Farm Consumption 
/ Constant and Variable Capital
For beef production, the estimated 1960 consumption/investment ratio
is .009 ( 47, 483, 000 divided by $5, 395,000,000); for snine, it is .041
( 84, 945, 000 divided by $2,054, 000,000) (Table A2. 4).
The folloning formula Has used to calculate under-utilized 
production capacity:
Under-utilization of Production Capacity 
= The Number of Red Meat Animals Born During the Year
- The greatest number of red meat animals born from 1945
up to and including the year in question
For beef production, the estimated 1960 under-utilization of 
production capacity is -3,246,000 cattle and calves (39,355,000 minus 
42, 601,000); for snine, it is -12, 370, 000 ( 88, 216,000 minus
100,586,000) (Table A2. 5) .
As an indicator of state involvement in the red meat industry, 
direct government payments to the farm sector Here converted to 
constant 1967 dollars. Table A2. 6 shons the figures for direct 
government payments to the farm sector since 1945.
84
lable 4^1
PRICE INDEXES AND DEFLATORS 1967 = 1.000
YEAR
-PRODUCER AND 
TOTAL 
FARM 
PRODUCTS
CONSUMER 
FARM 
FOODS 
& FEED
PRICE INDEXES- 
OTHER 
FARM ENERGY 
PRODUCTS
---GNP PRICE DEFLATORS-—
-FIXED INVESTMENT- 
DURABLE STRUC- TOTAL 
EQUIPMENT TURES GNP
1 945 0. 785 0. 785 0, 785 0. 539 0. 401 0. 423 0, 437
1946 0. 909 0. 909 0. 909 0. 585 0. 474 0. 498 0. 540
1947 0. 943 0. 829 1. 094 0. 669 0. 539 0. 588 0. 61 6
1948 1. 015 0. 887 1. 1 75 0. 721 0. 586 0. 649 0. 657
1949 0. 896 0. 806 1. 016 0. 71 4 0. 625 0. 639 0. 655
1 950 0. 939 0. 834 1. 067 0. 721 0. 651 0. 646 0. 666
1951 1. 069 0. 927 1. 242 0. 778 0. 687 0. 725 0. 699
1952 1. 027 0. 916 1. 172 0. 795 0. 701 0. 732 0. 710
1953 0. 960 0. 874 1. 062 0. 801 0. 721 0. 749 0. 721
1954 0. 957 0. 889 1. 047 0. 805 0. 745 0. 735 0. 733
1 955 0. 912 0. 850 0. 982 0. 802 0. 763 0. 749 0. 758
1956 0. 906 0. 849 0. 969 0. 814 0. 807 0. 828 0. 783
1957 0. 937 0. 874 0. 995 0. 901 0. 867 0. 866 0. 811
1958 0. 981 0. 918 1. 039 0. 903 0. 885 0. 852 0. 827
1959 0. 935 0. 894 0. 975 0. 91 8 0. 904 0. 859 0. 847
1960 0. 937 0. 895 0. 972 0. 942 0. 927 0. 866 0. 861
1961 0. 937 0. 910 0. 963 0. 944 0. 935 0. 859 0. 869
1962 0. 947 0. 919 0. 980 0. 947 0. 940 0. 866 0. 889
1963 0. 938 0. 925 0. 960 0. 950 0. 943 0. 876 0. 903
1964 0. 932 0. 923 0. 946 0. 946 0. 943 0. 890 0. 916
1965 0. 971 0. 955 0. 987 0. 963 0. 948 0. 924 0. 942
1966 1. 035 1. 012 1. 059 0. 978 0. 969 0. 969 0. 975
1967 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000
1 968 1. 024 1. 022 1. 025 1. 01 5 1. 039 1. 045 1. 050
1 969 1. 080 1. 073 1. 091 1. 042 1. 081 1. 1 31 1. 109
1 970 1.117 1. 121 1.110 1. 070 1. 125 1. 210 1. 170
1 971 1. 1 39 1.145 1. 129 1.112 1. 185 1. 309 1. 237
1972 1. 224 1. 208 1. 250 1. 143 1. 21 9 1. 395 1. 295
1973 1. 591 1. 481 1. 763 1. 235 1. 232 1. 502 1. 379
1 974 1. 774 1. 709 1. 877 1. 597 1. 331 1. 701 1. 504
1975 1. 842 1. 826 1. 867 1. 766 1. 555 1. 880 1. 652
1976 1. 831 1. 780 1. 910 1. 893 1. 677 1. 979 1. 758
1977 1. 888 1. 861 1. 925 2. 073 1. 779 2. 11 7 1. 875
1 978 2. 066 2. 026 2. 125 2. 204 1. 909 2. 333 2. 011
1979 2. 298 2. 225 2. 41 4 2. 759 2. 047 2. 61 9 2. 1 89
1980 2. 447 2. 41 2 2. 494 3. 611 2. 240 2. 873 2. 387
1981 2. 51 5 2. 487 2. 549 4. 100 2. 440 3. 199 2. 61 8
1982 2. 489 2. 51 5 2. 424 4. 1 61 2. 604 3. 436 2. 786
1983 2. 539 2. 559 2. 482 4. 193 2. 602 3. 340 2. 891
SOURCE: Economic Report of the President (1986).
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Iable A.-2
COSTS FOR THE ENTIRE FARM SECTOR 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
FEEDER TRUCKS SERVICE — OVERHEAD—
YEAR FEED LIVE- ENERGY TRAC- BUILD- GEN- LIVE- LAND LABOR
STOCK TORS INGS ERAL STOCK
1945 3 488 1 288 1 083 923 856 3 695 334 4 21 2 5 257
1946 3 325 1 287 1 186 964 1 509 3 523 291 3 473 4 686
1 947 4 519 1 261 1 31 4 1 692 1 498 3 616 31 0 3 920 4 521
1 948 4 505 1 352 1 501 2 041 1 444 3 666 307 3 663 4 547
1949 3 752 1 505 1 639 2 090 1 388 3 616 328 3 394 4 287
1950 3 936 1 878 1 752 1 952 1 362 3 631 344 3 629 4 222
1951 4 470 1 962 1 729 1 828 1 288 3 91 5 383 3 779 4 1 78
1952 4 728 1 637 1 747 1 576 1 297 4 084 384 3 903 4 022
1953 4 31 4 1 243 1 820 1 525 1 212 3 998 383 3 630 3 792
1954 4 394 1 493 1 850 1 271 1 160 3 826 399 3 568 3 544
1955 4 565 1 567 1 903 1 308 1 1 39 3 824 401 3 432 3 451
1956 4 587 1 662 1 919 1 053 1 042 3 935 400 3 487 3 374
1957 4 61 7 1 944 1 771 1 030 1 009 3 970 389 3 396 3 373
1 958 4 947 2 601 1 757 1 195 987 3 954 401 3 612 3 435
1959 5 306 2 762 1 753 1 352 1 298 4 283 469 3 635 3 429
1960 5 086 2 578 1 763 997 1 387 4 065 491 3 81 2 3 559
1961 5 234 2 834 1 809 1 124 1 346 4 025 525 4 1 89 3 673
1962 5 644 3 167 1 824 1 278 1 482 4 008 539 4 392 3 71 3
1963 6 1 51 3 048 1 856 1 410 1 507 3 912 551 4 660 3 767
1964 5 972 2 557 1 894 1 522 1 495 3 896 572 4 807 3 801
1965 5 941 2 950 1 886 1 598 1 500 3 791 567 5 135 3 827
1966 6 325 3 347 1 910 1 775 1 531 3 867 599 5 357 3 777
1 967 6 646 3 431 1 907 1 744 1 702 4 009 608 5 329 3 723
1 968 6 220 3 586 1 897 1 639 1 530 3 842 61 2 5 494 3 733
1 969 6 617 3 873 1 91 5 1 51 7 1 494 3 737 567 5 540 3 744
1 970 7 1 61 3 895 1 883 1 529 1 550 3 587 568 5 479 3 686
1 971 7 030 4 538 1 852 1 534 1 463 3 586 572 5 366 3 51 0
1 972 6 951 5 334 1 801 1 71 5 1 279 3 532 567 6 1 01 3 496
1 973 8 929 4 575 1 851 2 1 56 1 681 3 649 550 7 290 3 738
1974 8 492 2 734 1 998 2 330 1 91 0 3 974 537 6 669 4 039
1 975 7 068 2 653 2 21 5 2 279 1 985 4 01 2 544 6 377 3 987
1976 8 073 3 081 2 548 2 501 2 006 4 139 566 6 1 1 1 4 273
1 977 7 505 3 674 2 61 7 2 491 2 093 4 292 592 6 082 4 243
1 978 7 915 4 776 2 721 2 678 2 232 4 540 620 6 278 4 1 1 7
1979 8 680 5 390 2 567 2 834 2 1 34 4 651 657 6 802 4 1 02
1980 8 694 4 278 2 605 2 429 1 81 5 4 538 671 6 883 3 893
1981 8 386 3 530 2 51 6 2 156 1 473 4 253 665 7 051 3 411
1 982 7 392 4 000 2 364 1 686 1 105 4 1 83 624 7 1 42 3 656
1983 8 308 3 551 2 274 1 724 994 4 218 683 6 622 3 385
SOURCE: Lucier, et al. ( 1986:22-26). See also Table A. 1.
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Ia&l§ 4..21
MARKET RECEIPTS 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
YEAR ALL FARM 
COMMODITIES
ALL
LIVESTOCK
GRAZING
ANIMALS
MEAT
ANIMALS
CATTLE
CALVES
HOGS
PIGS
1 945 27, 596 15 297 8 642 7 51 6 4 227 2 883
1 946 27, 285 1 5 166 8 748 7 746 4 1 38 3 209
1 947 31, 410 17 526 10 060 9 857 5 267 4 1 63
1 948 29, 780 16 876 10 042 9 216 5 207 3 606
1 949 31, 032 17 198 10 098 9 291 5 412 3 488
1950 30, 310 17 1 51 10 560 9 884 6 049 3 423
1951 30, 737 18 353 11 187 10 627 6 553 3 638
1952 31, 673 17 759 10 990 9 796 6 043 3 373
1953 32, 293 17 628 10 094 9 040 5 081 3 628
1 954 31, 172 17 007 10 090 9 266 5 31 7 3 61 0
1955 32, 336 17 508 1 0 821 9 052 5 751 2 954
1 956 33, 555 18 061 11 338 9 184 5 908 2 91 2
1957 31, 71 2 1 8 544 11 785 9 964 6 344 3 268
1958 34, 104 1 9 599 1 2 547 11 261 7 464 3 432
1959 35, 986 20 21 8 1 3 775 11 71 3 8 379 2 978
1960 36, 299 20 266 13 418 11 285 7 876 3 062
1961 37, 527 20 825 1 3 766 11 749 8 068 3 364
1962 38, 509 21 286 14 229 12 316 8 640 3 339
1963 39, 954 21 372 14 285 12 21 6 8 649 3 233
1964 40, 048 21 402 14 209 11 950 8 353 3 255
1965 40, 541 22 540 14 834 1 3 263 9 209 3 71 5
1966 41, 967 24 181 15 843 1 4 427 10 077 4 028
1967 42, 81 7 24 383 16 669 1 4 661 10 550 3 809
1968 43, 1 47 24 890 17 195 1 5 01 4 11 000 3 706
1 969 44, 610 26 456 17 760 1 6 349 11 641 4 391
1970 45, 218 26 439 1 8 398 1 6 513 1 2 205 4 009
1 971 46, 311 26 759 19 449 1 7 051 1 3 1 57 3 61 0
1 972 49, 923 29 071 21 065 1 9 533 1 4 900 4 344
1 973 54, 611 28 769 19 444 19 016 14 039 4 732
1 974 52, 081 23 295 1 5 640 1 4 1 83 1 0 059 3 91 6
1 975 48, 264 23 393 15 137 14 018 9 511 4 298
1 976 52, 078 25 299 17 033 1 4 842 10 537 4 090
1 977 50, 972 25 230 17 182 14 773 1 0 712 3 856
1 978 54, 289 28 636 20 088 1 8 1 29 1 3 673 4 237
1979 57, 226 30 129 21 857 1 9 388 1 5 242 3 942
1 980 57, 11 5 27 785 19 922 16 850 1 3 003 3 655
1 981 56, 496 27 495 19 1 46 1 5 804 1 1 745 3 894
1 982 57, 428 28 231 19 511 16 439 11 978 4 282
1 983 53* 667 27 351 1 8 877 15 31 8 1 1 297 3 854
SOURCE: Lucier, etal. ( 1986:9-21). See also Table A.I.
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I§&1£ 4*-22
FARM SLAUGHTER 
IN MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
YEAR CATTLE
CALVES
HOGS
PIGS
YEAR CATTLE
CALVES
HOGS
PIGS
1 945 73 480 1 965 1 66 132
1 946 79 532 1 966 1 78 1 32
1947 92 632 1967 1 76 111
1948 95 534 1 968 1 79 103
1949 93 433 1969 1 92 1 05
1950 100 378 1970 218 117
1951 115 363 1971 229 87
1952 116 320 1972 279 115
1953 98 350 1 973 300 1 31
1954 107 336 1974 285 1 23
1955 117 264 1975 249 1 45
1956 1 21 236 1 976 274 1 47
1957 1 30 260 1 977 255 1 39
1958 1 64 281 1 978 273 1 38
1 959 1 76 216 1979 302 111
1960 166 195 1 980 255 88
1961 172 194 1 981 239 82
1962 1 78 165 1 982 232 72
1963 175 1 44 1983 21 9 49
1964 165 124
SOURCE: Agricultural Statistics (1945 to 1984)
See also Table A. 1.
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ESTIMATED FEED COSTS 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1945 964 657 1 965 2, 427 979
1946 907 703 1 966 2, 636 1, 054
1947 1, 358 1, 073 1 967 2, 876 1, 038
1948 1, 390 963 1 968 2, 749 926
1949 1, 1 81 761 1969 2, 911 1, 098
1 950 1, 388 786 1 970 3, 306 1, 086
1 951 1, 596 886 1971 3, 456 948
1952 1, 609 898 1 972 3, 563 1, 039
1 953 1, 243 888 1973 4, 357 1, 469
1954 1, 374 933 1974 3, 667 1, 428
1955 1, 499 770 1 975 2, 874 1, 299
1 956 1, 500 739 1976 3, 363 1, 305
1 957 1, 579 814 1977 3, 1 87 1,147
1 958 1, 884 866 1978 3, 779 1,171
1 959 2, 199 781 1979 4, 391 1, 1 36
1960 1, 977 768 1980 4, 069 1, 1 44
1 961 2, 028 845 1981 3, 582 1, 1 88
1962 2, 291 885 1982 3, 1 36 1,121
1963 2, 489 931 1983 3, 432 1,171
1964 2, 331 908
SOURCE: See Tables A.2 and A.31.
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Iabls £•_&
ESTIMATED LIVESTOCK COSTS 
MILLIONS OF 1 967 DOLLARS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1945 356 243 1965 1 205 486
1946 351 272 1 966 1 395 557
1947 379 299 1 967 1 485 536
1948 41 7 289 1968 1 585 534
1 949 474 305 1969 1 704 643
1950 662 375 1970 1 798 591
1951 701 389 1971 2 231 61 2
1952 557 311 1972 2 734 797
1 953 358 256 1973 2 232 752
1954 467 317 1974 1 180 460
1955 515 264 1975 1 079 487
1 956 544 268 1976 1 283 498
1957 665 343 1977 1 560 562
1 958 990 455 1978 2 281 707
1 959 1, 145 407 1979 2 727 705
1960 1, 002 390 1980 2 002 563
1961 1, 098 458 1981 1 508 500
1962 1, 286 497 1982 1 697 607
1963 1» 233 461 1983 1 467 500
1964 998 389
SOURCE: See Tables A. 2 and A. 31.
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Table At
ESTIMATED ENERGY COSTS 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1945 1 66 113 1965 428 173
1946 1 80 1 40 1966 459 183
1947 220 174 1967 470 170
1948 262 182 1968 484 163
1 949 286 184 1969 500 188
1 950 350 198 1970 508 167
1 951 369 205 1971 526 1 44
1 952 333 186 1 972 538 1 57
1953 286 205 1973 476 160
1954 31 5 214 1974 386 1 50
1955 338 1 74 1 975 437 197
1956 338 167 1976 516 200
1957 354 183 1 977 550 1 98
1958 385 1 77 1 978 685 21 2
1959 408 145 1979 684 177
1960 383 149 1980 593 167
1961 389 1 62 1981 523 1 73
1962 409 158 1982 493 1 76
1963 402 1 50 1 983 479 1 63
1964 395 154
SOURCE: See Tables A. 2 and A. 31.
Table
ESTIMATED MACHINERY COSTS 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1945 141 96 1 965 363 1 46
1946 1 46 113 1966 426 170
1947 284 224 1 967 430 1 55
1948 357 247 1968 41 8 141
1949 364 235 1969 396 1 49
1950 390 220 1970 41 3 136
1951 390 216 1971 436 120
1952 301 168 1972 512 1 49
1953 240 1 71 1 973 554 1 87
1954 217 1 47 1974 450 175
1955 233 119 1975 449 203
1956 185 91 1976 506 196
1957 206 1 06 1977 524 188
1958 262 120 1978 674 209
1959 31 5 112 1979 755 195
1960 216 84 1980 553 1 55
1961 242 101 1981 448 1 49
1962 287 111 1982 352 1 26
1 963 305 114 1983 363 1 24
1964 31 7 1 24
SOURCE: See Tables A. 2 and A. 31.
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Table Aj_8
ESTIMATED STRUCTURE COSTS 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1945 N/A 89 1965 N/A 1 37
1946 N/A 1 77 1966 N/A 1 47
1947 N/A 198 1967 N/A 1 51
1948 N/A 175 1968 N/A 1 31
1 949 N/A 1 56 1969 N/A 147
1 950 N/A 1 54 1970 N/A 1 37
1951 N/A 152 1 971 N/A 11 4
1952 N/A 138 1 972 N/A 111
1953 N/A 136 1 973 N/A 1 46
1 954 N/A 134 1974 N/A 1 44
1955 N/A 104 1975 N/A 1 77
1956 N/A 90 1976 N/A 1 58
1957 N/A 1 04 1977 N/A 1 58
1958 N/A 99 1978 N/A 1 74
1959 N/A 1 07 1 979 N/A 1 47
1960 N/A 117 1980 N/A 116
1961 N/A 121 1981 N/A 1 02
1962 N/A 128 1982 N/A 82
1963 N/A 122 1983 N/A 71
1964 N/A 1 22
SOURCE: See Tables A. 2 and A. 31.
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Isblg 4^2
ESTIMATED OVERHEAD COSTS 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1945 658 449 1965 1 093 441
1 946 61 4 476 1966 1 178 471
1947 700 553 1967 1 251 452
1948 736 510 1968 1 250 421
1949 734 473 1969 1 225 462
1950 846 479 1970 1 230 404
1951 971 539 1971 1 300 357
1952 910 508 1972 1 345 392
1953 739 528 1973 1 207 407
1 954 777 528 1 974 1 000 389
1955 81 2 417 1 975 1 01 2 457
1956 824 406 1 976 1 073 417
1957 927 478 1 977 1 1 53 41 5
1958 1, 018 468 1 978 1 440 446
1959 1, 192 423 1979 1 571 406
1960 1,073 417 1 980 1 347 379
1 961 1, 069 446 1 981 1 1 68 387
1962 1,118 432 1 982 1 1 37 407
1963 1, 070 400 1 983 1 170 399
1 964 1, 036 404
SOURCE: See Tables A. 2 and A. 31.
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Table Al^Oi
LAND UTILIZATION 
IN MILLIONS OP ACRES
PRIVATE TOTAL PASTURE PRIVATE TOTAL PASTURE
YEAR PASTURE & PRIVATE GRASSLAND YEAR PASTURE & PRIVATE GRASSLAND
GRASSLAND FARM AREA TO TOTAL GRASSLAND FARM AREA TO TOTAL
1 940 718 1» 904 37. 7% 1964 695 2, 268 30. 7%
1 945 709 1, 904 37. 2% 1965 694 2, 267 30. 6%
1946 707 1, 904 37. 1% 1 966 694 2, 266 30. 6%
1947 705 1» 904 37. 0% 1 967 693 2, 265 30. 6%
1948 704 1, 904 37. 0% 1968 692 2S 265 30. 6%
1 949 702 1, 904 36. 9% 1 969 692 2, 264 30. 6%
1950 700 1, 904 36. 8% 1970 690 2, 264 30. 5$
1951 700 1, 904 36. 8% 1 971 688 2, 264 30. 4%
1952 700 1, 904 36. 8% 1 972 685 2, 264 30. 3%
1 953 700 1, 904 36. 7% 1973 683 2, 264 30. 2%
1954 700 1, 904 36. 7% 1974 681 2, 264 30. 1 %
1955 699 1, 904 36. 7% 1975 677 2, 264 29. 9%
1 956 699 1, 904 36. 7% 1976 672 2, 264 29. 7%
1957 699 1, 904 36. 7% 1977 668 2, 264 29. 5%
1958 699 1, 904 36. 7% 1978 663 2, 264 29. 3%
1 959 699 2, 271 30. 8% 1979 . 663 2, 264 29. 3%
1960 698 2, 270 30. 8% 1980 663 2, 264 29. 3%
1961 697 2, 270 30. 7% 1981 662 2, 264 29. 2%
1 962 697 2, 269 30. 756 1982 662 2, 265 29. 2%
1963 696 2, 268 30. 7% 1983 662 2, 265 29. 2%
SOURCE: Agricultural Statistics (1985:372).
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lable Ai^.02
ESTIMATED LAND COSTS 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1945 460 N/A 1965 586 N/A
1946 366 N/A 1966 626 N/A
1947 456 N/A 1967 619 N/A
1948 421 N/A 1 968 644 N/A
1 949 402 N/A 1969 666 N/A
1 950 459 N/A 1970 664 N/A
1 951 488 N/A 1971 662 N/A
1 952 473 N/A 1972 784 N/A
1953 403 N/A 1973 953 N/A
1954 41 4 N/A 1974 774 N/A
1955 402 N/A 1975 71 8 N/A
1956 400 N/A 1976 673 N/A
1957 403 N/A 1977 671 N/A
1958 473 N/A 1978 751 N/A
1959 408 N/A 1979 833 N/A
1960 413 N/A 1 980 789 N/A
1961 453 N/A 1981 759 N/A
1962 491 N/A 1982 769 N/A
1963
1964
51 9 
520
N/A
N/A
1983 695 N/A
SOURCE: U._S^ Census of Agriculture ( 1 945: 1 ;
1 974: 
A. 31 ,
76-77; 1978:102 
and A1.01.
-103) . See also Tables A. 2,
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Iabls Al.ll
MILLIONS OF 
LABOR HOURS
YEAR ALL
FARM HORK
MEAT
ANIMALS
YEAR ALL
FARM HORK
MEAT
ANIMALS
1945 18, 838 1, 438 1965 7, 335 1, 107
1 946 18, 080 1, 408 1966 6, 858 1, 092
1947 17, 196 1, 381 1967 6, 677 1, 078
1948 16, 833 1, 349 1968 6, 41 6 1, 050
1949 16, 202 1, 386 1969 6, 198 1, 008
1950 15, 137 1, 451 1970 5, 896 997
1 951 15,222 1, 520 1971 5, 741 962
1952 14,504 1, 51 0 1972 5, 433 905
1953 13,966 1, 462 1973 5, 321 850
1 954 1 3, 31 0 1, 479 1974 5, 1 78 81 2
1 955 12,808 1, 498 1975 4, 975 731
1 956 12, 028 1, 434 1976 4, 788 693
1 957 11,059 1, 368 1977 4, 654 653
1958 10,548 1, 357 1 978 4, 446 606
1959 10,301 1, 395 1979 4, 347 574
1960 9, 795 1, 307 1 980 4, 281 547
1961 9, 400 1, 293 1981 4, 202 509
1962 8, 979 1, 252 1 982 4, 035 475
1963 8, 664 1, 236 1983 3, 688 456
1964 8, 194 1, 191
SOURCE: Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector
(1984:31).
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ESTIMATED HIRED LABOR COSTS 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1945 226 1 54 1965 401 1 62
1946 195 151 1966 420 1 68
1947 194 153 1967 433 1 56
1948 206 143 1968 448 1 51
1 949' 214 138 1969 434 1 64
1950 248 1 40 1970 461 1 51
1951 257 143 1971 454 1 25
1952 258 144 1972 444 1 30
1953 223 159 1973 441 1 49
1 954 226 153 1974 449 1 75
1 955 256 1 32 1975 397 180
1956 259 128 1976 439 170
1957 266 1 37 1 977 432 1 55
1958 293 1 35 1 978 423 131
1959 332 118 1979 426 110
1960 331 129 1980 384 108
1961 347 145 1981 307 1 02
1962 363 140 1982 31 4 11 2
1963 381 142 1983 309 1 05
1964 386 1 50
SOURCE: See Tables A. 2, A. 31, and A1.11.
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Table 41^21
BEEF PRODUCTION PRODUCTION COSTS 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
TOTAL TOTAL
YEAR CONSTANT VARIABLE PRODUCTION YEAR CONSTANT VARIABLE PRODUCTION
CAPITAL CAPITAL COSTS CAPITAL CAPITAL COSTS
1 945 2, 745 226 2, 971 1 965 6, 1 03 401 6, 504
1946 2, 564 1 95 2, 759 1 966 6, 720 420 7, 140
1947 3, 397 194 3, 591 1 967 7, 129 433 7, 562
1948 3, 583 206 3, 789 1 968 7, 130 448 7, 577
1949 3, 441 214 3, 654 1 969 7, 402 434 7, 835
1950 4, 094 248 4, 342 1970 7y 920 461 8, 381
1951 4, 515 257 4, 772 1971 8, 611 454 9, 065
1952 4, 1 83 258 4} 441 1972 9, 475 444 9, 919
1953 3, 270 223 3, 493 1973 9, 779 441 10, 220
1954 3, 564 226 3, 790 1 974 7y 456 449 7, 906
1955 3, 799 256 4, 056 1975 6, 569 397 6, 966
1 956 3, 791 259 4, 050 1976 7, 41 4 439 7, 853
1957 4, 134 266 4, 400 1977 7, 644 432 8, 076
1958 5, 012 293 5, 305 1978 9, 610 423 10, 033
1959 5, 666 332 5, 999 1979 10,961 426 11,386
1 960 5, 063 331 5} 395 1 980 9, 353 384 9, 736
1 961 5, 278 347 5, 625 1981 7, 989 307 8, 296
1 962 5, 882 363 6, 245 1982 7, 584 31 4 7, 898
1 963 6, 019 381 6, 400 1983 7, 604 309 7, 91 3
1964 5, 597 386 5, 983
SOURCE: See Tables A. 4, A. 5, A. 6, A. 7, A. 8, A. 9, A1.02, and A1. 12.
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Table Al.^22
SHINE PRODUCTION COSTS 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
TOTAL TOTAL
YEAR CONSTANT VARIABLE PRODUCTION YEAR CONSTANT VARIABLE PRODUCTION
CAPITAL CAPITAL COSTS CAPITAL CAPITAL COSTS
1 945 1, 648 1 54 1, 802 1 965 2, 363 162 2y 525
1946 1, 882 1 51 2, 033 1 966 2, 583 168 2y 751
1947 2) 523 1 53 2, 676 1 967 2, 502 1 56 2y 658
1948 2, 365 143 2, 507 1 968 2, 316 1 51 2, 467
1949 2, 11 4 138 2, 252 1 969 2, 688 164 2, 851
1 950 2, 211 140 2, 351 1970 2y 521 151 2, 672
1 951 2, 388 143 2, 531 1971 2, 295 125 2y 420
1 952 2, 209 1 44 2, 353 1972 2y 645 130 2, 775
1 953 2y 183 1 59 2, 343 1973 3, 1 21 1 49 3, 269
1 954 2, 273 1 53 2, 427 1 974 2y 745 175 2y 920
1955
00 1 32 1, 981 1975 2, 820 1 80 3, 000
1956 1, 762 128 1, 889 1976 2, 774 1 70 2y 944
1957 2, 026 1 37 2, 163 1977 2, 669 1 55 2y 824
1958 2, 1 86 135 2, 321 1978 2, 920 131 3, 051
1959 1, 976 118 2» 094 1979 2y 766 110 2y 876
1960 1, 925 129 2, 054 1980 2, 523 108 2y 631
1961 2, 1 32 145 2, 277 1981 2y 499 102 2y 600
1 962 2, 212 1 40 2> 352 1982 2, 51 9 112 2y 631
1963 2, 178 142 2, 320 1983 2y 429 1 05 2y 534
1 964 2, 1 00 1 50 2, 251
SOURCE: See Tables A. 4, A. 5, A. 6, A. 7, A. 8, A. 9, A1.02, and A1.12.
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Jable A1
ESTIMATED SURPLUS VALUE 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1945 1, 328 1, 561 1965 2, 871 1,322
1946 1, 458 1, 708 1966 3, 11 5 1, 410
1 947 1, 769 2,119 1967 3, 164 1, 262
1 948 1, 512 1, 632 1968 3, 601 1, 341
1949 1, 850 1, 669 1969 3, 997 1, 644
1950 1, 807 1, 450 1970 4, 042 1, 454
1951 1, 896 1, 470 1971 4, 322 1, 277
1952 1, 717 1, 340 1972 5, 260 1, 684
1953 1, 686 1, 635 1973 4, 11 9 1, 594
1954 1, 633 1, 520 1974 2, 438 1,119
1955 1, 81 3 1, 238 1975 2, 794 1, 443
1956 1, 980 1, 259 1976 2, 959 1, 292
1957 2, 074 1, 365 1977 2, 892 1, 171
1958 2, 323 1, 393 1978 3, 91 3 1, 324
1959 2, 556 1, 100 1 979 4, 1 57 1, 176
1960 2, 648 1, 203 1980 3, 522 1,112
1961 2, 61 5 1, 281 1981 3, 688 1, 376
1962 2, 574 1, 152 1982 4, 312 1, 723
1963 2, 424 1, 057 1983 3, 602 1, 369
1964 2, 535 1, 1 29
SOURCE: See Tables A. 31, A. 32, A1.21, and A1. 22.
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ESTIMATED RATE OF EXPLOITATION
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1 945 588. 62 1014. 3% 1965 71 5. 92 817. 12
1 946 748. 0% 11 30. 0% 1966 741.72 839. 62
1 947 911.7% 1382.0% 1 967 731.52 808.02
1 948 734. 52 1145. 02 1 968 804. 62 889. 52
1949 866. 22 1212, 52 1 969 921.92 1 005. 42
1950 729.5% 1034. 2% 1 970 877.42 961. 12
1951 737.02 1029. 4% 1971 952.22 1 025. 72
1952 664. 9% 929. 7% 1972 11 84. 22 1300.72
1953 755. 42 1026. 3% 1973 934. 52 1072. 42
1954 722. 92 990. 9% 1974 542.72 640. 02
1955 706.8% 939.4% 1975 702. 82 803. 32
1956 765. 0% 987. 1% 1976 673. 82 758.52
1957 780. 72 997. 62 1977 670.02 753. 62
1958 793. 12 1033. 82 1978 924. 72 1009. 82
1959 769. 52 931.4% 1979 976. 22 1068. 12
1960 798. 9% 934. 12 1980 91 7. 42 1030. 32
1961 753. 8% 885. 7% 1981 1201.22 1351.22
1 962 708. 6% 820.6% 1982 1375. 12 1 536. 72
1963 637. 2% 743. 1% 1983 1166. 92 1299. 82
1964 656. 62 750.32
SOURCE: See Tables A1.3 and A1.12.
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Table A1^5
LIVESTOCK INVENTORY 
THOUSAND
AS OF 
HEAD
JANUARY 1
CATTLE HOGS CATTLE HOGS
Year AND AND Year AND AND
CALVES PIGS CALVES PIGS
1945 89, 419 59,373 1965 116,485 50,792
1946 86,798 61,306 1966 11 6, 811 47,414
1947 84,534 56, 810 1967 11 5, 731 53,249
1948 80,945 54,590 1968 117,429 55,275
1949 80,369 56,257 1969 117,636 60,829
1950 82,469 58,937 1970 119,238 57,046
1951 86,734 62,269 1 971 124,481 67,285
1952 92,202 62, 117 1972 128,781 62, 412
1 953 96,846 51,755 1973 131,240 59,017
1954 100, 216 45, 114 1 974 132,248 60,614
1 955 100,692 50,474 1975 141,923 54,201
1956 100,580 55,354 1976 136,277 48,922
1957 97,930 51,897 1977 133,563 54,659
1958 97,894 51,517 1978 126,598 56, 313
1959 99,861 58,045 1979 1 19, 912 60,356
1960 102, 139 59,087 1980 119,534 67,353
1961 104, 41 3 55,560 1981 121,667 64,512
1962 108,432 56,619 1982 126, 115 58,688
1963 110,968 57,933 1983 122,160 53,935
1964 11 3, 653 56,777
SOURCE: Agricultural Statistics (1967:367,372;
1983:265, 272; 1985:256,263).
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Table 41^6
ADJUSTMENTS TO LIVESTOCK INVENTORY 
THOUSAND HEAD
----------- CATTLE AND-CALVES----------  --------HOGS AND PIGS--------
Year CALF DEATH MILK STOCKER PIG DEATH STOCKER
CROP LOSS COHS CATTLE CROP LOSS SHINE
1945 35 1 55 4 31 5 38 549 35 959 86 827 1 737 42 251
1946 34 643 4 096 37 683 35 762 82 694 1 654 39 494
1 947 34 703 3 930 36 169 34 330 83 289 1 666 39 446
1 948 33 1 23 3 635 35 270 34 290 83 826 1 677 42 895
1949 33 748 3 840 35 455 35 703 93 244 1 865 46 078
1 950 34 899 3 742 35 398 39 656 97 381 1 948 49 050
1 951 35 825 3 863 35 235 44 437 100 586 1 941 46 774
1952 38 273 4 034 35 921 49 1 73 88 829 1 652 40 1 67
1953 41 261 4 060 36 161 51 289 77 914 1 395 38 285
1954 42 601 4 063 35 342 52 806 86 830 1 493 38 782
1 955 42 112 4 052 34 209 52 208 95 729 1 580 45 231
1956 41 376 3 91 2 33 391 50 578 89 426 1 413 43 1 61
1957 39 905 3 801 31 962 49 962 87 362 1 319 43 897
1 958 38 860 3 810 30 708 52 683 93 533 1 347 49 965
1 959 38 938 3 876 30 181 55 481 99 395 1 362 48 884
1960 39 355 4 100 29 733 56 970 88 216 1 147 47 726
1 961 40 180 4 01 8 29 114 60 152 92 71 5 1 1 96 49 025
1962 41 441 4 125 28 022 64 21 5 93 608 1 1 98 50 453
1963 42 268 4 040 26 734 68 500 94 056 1 195 48 802
1 964 43 809 4 232 25 564 71 316 87 544 1 103 44 646
1965 43 928 4 248 23 998 72 115 78 940 987 40 669
1966 43 473 4 047 22 879 72 879 85 526 1 061 48 1 35
1 967 43 647 4 040 23 215 71 336 91 310 1 1 23 49 206
1968 44 31 5 4 012 22 470 72 640 94 1 55 1 1 49 50 221
1969 45 1 77 4 1 23 22 103 75 001 88 676 1 073 49 797
1970 45 871 4 297 21 865 77 1 05 101 714 1 221 55 562
1 971 46 738 4 442 22 003 79 862 97 924 1 244 51 418
1972 47 682 5 126 21 926 83 062 90 574 1 205 48 784
1973 49 194 6 487 22 090 87 940 88 1 23 1 243 47 365
1974 50 873 6 110 21 825 93 872 83 744 1 239 42 868
1975 50 183 6 992 22 41 8 88 469 71 186 1 099 41 910
1976 47 384 5 190 22 933 82 994 84 395 1 361 47 830
1977 45 931 6 000 22 731 76 777 86 162 1 448 49 041
1978 43 818 5 800 22 167 72 255 88 51 2 1 549 53 567
1 979 42 596 5 600 22 049 73 144 102 792 1 799 58 305
1980 44 938 5 41 3 22 471 76 360 1 01 720 1 780 54 520
1981 44 666 5 059 22 723 77 225 93 853 1 642 50 650
1982 44 200 5 429 23 557 75 231 85 189 1 491 49 431
1983 43 925 5 494 23 492 73 837 93 1 55 1 630 50 226
SOURCE: Agricultural Statistics ( 1967: 381, 386; 1983:280, 282;
1985:271,274).
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Table AI^Z
LIVESTOCK MARKETED 
THOUSAND HEAD
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1 945 40,763 61,035 1 965 56,086 76,079
1946 39,293 64,409 1966 57,491 76,504
1947 40,874 63,499 1967 57,337 85,528
1948 36,024 61,790 1 968 58,602 87,726
1949 35,532 69,249 1 969 58,157 88,074
1 950 34,692 72,673 1970 58,962 86,919
1 951 33,966 79,142 1971 61,229 98,644
1952 35,898 80,448 1972 63,207 89,555
1953 42,738 68,572 1 973 60,021 82, 419
1 954 46,136 66, 012 1974 57,897 85,504
1955 47,295 75,400 1975 66,554 73,627
1956 49,733 79,091 1976 67,879 75,747
1957 47,595 74,087 1977 68,999 80,939
1 958 44,284 73, 419 1978 66,675 81,271
1959 44, 1 07 84,379 1979 58,509 92,499
1960 46,288 79,831 1980 56,528 1 00, 651
1961 47,036 80,326 1981 57,030 95,986
1962 48,585 81,743 1982 60, 109 86,972
1963 49,781 86, 163 1983 58,532 89, 129
1964 52,832 86,086
SOURCE: Agricultural Statistics (1967:381,386;
1983:280, 282; 1985: 271, 274).
Table A1_^8
FARM SLAUGHTER 
THOUSAND HEAD
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1945 1 672 1 3, 631 1965 1, 1 96 2, 61 3
1946 1 709 13, 721 1966 661 1, 31 9
1947 1 584 12,072 1967 621 1, 301
1 948 1 402 11,200 1968 568 1, 262
1949 1 322 10, 236 1969 486 1, 134
1950 1 241 9, 720 1970 462 1, 235
1 951 1 192 9, 479 1971 456 1, 21 0
1 952 1 263 8, 882 1972 503 1, 158
1953 1 392 7, 455 1973 570 1, 095
1 954 1 396 6, 668 1974 729 1, 321
1955 1 352 6, 835 1 975 750 1, 1 93
1956 1 380 6, 551 1976 722 1, 1 81
1957 1 285 6, 041 1977 700 1, 1 44
1958 1 236 5, 857 1978 550 1, 086
1959 1 181 6, 024 1979 430 1, 070
1960 1 195 5, 114 1980 401 1, 1 00
1961 1 218 4, 039 1 981 398 897
1962 1 1 94 4, 093 1982 395 654
1963 1 213 3, 793 1 983 41 0 51 7
1 964 1 242 3, 269
SOURCE: Agricultural Statistics (1967:381,386;
1983:280,282; 1985:271, 274).
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ESTIMATED OVERPRODUCTION 
THOUSAND HEAD
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1 945 3, 31 6 27,546 1965 2, 770 9, 384
1946 2, 898 24,722 1 966 2, 327 5, 921
1947 2, 350 23, 416 1967 2, 829 7, 401
1 948 3, 447 20,855 1968 3, 452 9, 072
1 949 2, 265 22,073 1969 2, 943 9, 427
1950 2, 639 22,927 1970 2, 41 8 13,824
1951 3, 866 25,519 1971 3, 227 12,694
1952 4, 1 86 19,796 1972 2, 639 12,285
1953 2, 467 13,962 1973 3, 326 1 5, 019
1954 3, 074 18,989 1 974 2, 688 1 3, 425
1955 3, 688 17, 1 58 1975 6, 923 7, 558
1956 2, 962 14,564 1976 3, 943 7, 1 98
1 957 3, 230 13, 915 1977 4, 287 8, 250
1958 4, 033 14,462 1978 2, 969 7, 352
1959 3, 973 16,792 1979 2, 776 9, 475
1960 3, 208 13, 485 1980 3, 299 11,022
1 961 3, 055 13,689 1981 3, 898 9, 190
1 962 3, 732 12, 740 1982 5, 594 5, 329
1 963 2t 968 12,037 1983 4, 320 5, 588
1 964 2, 276 9, 217
SOURCE: See Tables A1. 5, A1.6, A1.7, and A1.8.
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Jable 42^0
ESTIMATED VALUE PER HEAD
1 967 DOLLARS
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1945 101. 32 45. 04 1965 163. 66 48. 88
1946 102. 84 47. 89 1966 176. 35 53. 46
1947 126. 23 63. 45 1967 185. 07 45. 1 5
1 948 141.65 56. 72 1968 188. 93 42. 80
1949 149. 36 49. 33 1969 201.77 50. 39
1 950 171. 13 46. 13 1970 209.05 46. 81
1 951 189.66 45. 15 1971 21 7. 01 37! 03
1 952 1 65. 73 41. 34 1972 238.25 49. 16
1953 117.36 52. 33 1 973 236.66 58. 23
1954 11 4. 1 0 54. 30 1 974 1 76. 44 46. 52
1955 120. 63 39. 1 3 1 975 145. 01 59. 38
1956 117. 97 36. 76 1976 1 57. 60 55. 07
1957 132.44 44. 03 1977 157.36 48. 67
1958 167. 57 46. 84 1978 207. 46 53. 1 2
1 959 188. 90 35. 33 1979 263.72 43. 31
1960 169. 38 38. 34 1 980 232. 89 36. 78
1961 1 70. 77 42. 18 1 981 208.67 41. 04
1962 1 77. 1 5 40. 82 1 982 201.80 49. 69
1963 1 73. 04 37. 55 1983 1 95. 36 43. 53
1964 157.53 37. 82
SOURCE: See Tables A. 31, A. 32, A1. 7, and A1.8.
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Table A 2 ^ H
IMPUTED PRICE-VALUE FOR UNSOLD INVENTORY 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1 945 336 1, 241 1965 525 595
1 946 298 1, 1 84 1966 441 376
1947 297 1, 486 1967 537 470
1948 488 1, 323 1968 655 576
1949 338 1, 401 1969 594 598
1950 452 1, 455 1 970 505 877
1 951 733 1, 619 1 971 700 805
1952 794 1, 256 1 972 629 779
1953 468 886 1 973 792 953
1954 583 1, 205 1974 640 852
1955 699 1, 089 1975 1, 649 480
1956 562 924 1 976 939 457
1 957 61 3 883 1977 1, 021 523
1 958 765 918 1978 707 467
1959 754 1, 065 1 979 732 601
1960 608 856 1980 870 699
1 961 579 869 1981 1, 028 583
1962 708 808 1982 1, 475 338
1963 563 764 1983 1, 139 355
1 964 432 585
SOURCE: See Tables A1. 9 and A2. 0.
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Iabls 42.12
ESTIMATED FULL PRICE-VALUE LESS ACTUAL REVENUES 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1945 0 0 1965 1, 489 1, 1 46
1946 0 0 1966 774 777
1 947 0 0 1967 266 1, 589
1948 0 491 1968 43 1, 838
1949 0 1, 123 1969 0 1, 1 65
1950 0 1, 427 1 970 0 1, 467
1951 0 1, 622 1971 0 2, 639
1952 889 1, 975 1972 0 1, 297
1 953 3, 191 846 1973 96 436
1954 3, 592 665 1974 3, 624 1, 470
1955 3, 358 2, 000 1975 6, 275 305
1956 3, 664 2, 286 1976 5, 533 645
1957 2, 797 1, 556 1 977 5, 638 1, 213
1958 1, 005 1, 317 1978 2, 070 850
1959 34 2, 542 1979 0 1, 884
1960 963 2, 133 1 980 1, 755 2, 714
1961 91 2 1, 795 1981 3, 161 2, 171
1 962 623 1, 943 1982 3, 746 1, 206
1 963 847 2, 330 1983 4, 029 1, 785
1 964 1, 737 2, 290
SOURCE: See Tables A. 31, A. 32, A1.7, A1.8,
and A2.0.
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Table A2^
ESTIMATED UNREALIZED SURPLUS VALUE 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
CATTLE HOGS CATTLE HOGS
Year AND AND Year AND AND
n ii ii ii ii
CALVES PIGS
iiiiiiniinn
CALVES PIGS
1 945 336 1, 241 1 965 2, 01 5 1 , 742
1946 298 1, 184 1 966 1, 215 1, 153
1947 297 1, 485 1967 803 2, 059
1948 488 1, 81 5 1968 698 2, 41 3
1949 338 2, 523 1969 594 1, 763
1950 452 2, 882 1970 506 2, 344
1951 733 3, 241 1971 700 3, 444
1952 1, 683 3, 231 1972 629 2, 076
1953 3, 658 1, 732 1973 889 1, 389
1954 4, 1 75 1, 870 1974 4, 264 2, 321
1955 4, 057 3, 088 1975 7, 925 784
1956 4, 226 3, 21 0 1976 6, 472 1, 101
1957 3, 409 2, 439 1977 6, 659 1, 736
1958 1, 770 2, 234 1 978 2, 777 1, 317
1959 788 3, 608 1979 732 2, 485
1960 1, 571 2, 988 1980 2, 625 3, 41 3
1961 1, 491 2, 663 1981 4, 1 89 2, 754
1962 1, 331 2, 751 1982 5, 222 1, 544
1963 1, 410 3, 094 1983 5, 168 2, 1 40
1 964 2, 169 2, 875
SOURCE: See Tables A2.11and A2.12.
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I able A2._2
ESTIMATED ABSOLUTE SURPLUS VALUE 
MILLIONS OF 1967 DOLLARS
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
Year
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1 945 1, 664 2, 802 1965 4, 885 3, 064
1946 1, 756 2, 892 1966 4, 331 2, 563
1947 2, 065 3, 605 1967 3, 967 3, 321
1948 2, 000 3, 447 1968 4, 300 3, 755
1949 2, 189 4, 1 92 1969 4, 591 3, 407
1950 2, 259 4, 331 1970 4, 547 3, 799
1951 2, 629 4, 711 1971 5, 022 4, 721
1952 3, 401 4, 571 1972 5, 889 3, 761
1953 5, 344 3, 367 1973 5, 008 2, 982
1 954 5, 808 3, 390 1974 6, 702 3, 441
1955 5, 870 4, 326 1975 10, 71 8 2, 227
1 956 6, 206 4, 469 1 976 9, 431 2, 394
1 957 5, 483 3, 804 1977 9, 552 2, 908
1 958 4, 094 3, 627 1978 6, 691 2, 641
1959 3, 344 4, 707 1979 4, 889 3, 662
1960 4, 219 4} 192 1980 6, 1 47 4, 524
1961 4, 106 3, 945 1981 7, 877 4, 1 30
1962 3, 904 3, 903 1982 9, 534 3, 267
1963 3, 835 4, 1 51 1983 8, 770 3, 509
1964 4, 705 4, 004
SOURCE: See Tables A1. 3 and A2. 13.
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ESTIMATED OUTPUT/INVESTMENT RATIO
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1945 0. 012 0. 048 1965 0. 007 0. 031
1 946 0. 01 3 0, 041 1966 0. 006 0. 031
1 947 0. 010 0. 031 1967 0. 006 0. 034
1948 0. 009 0. 033 1968 0. 006 0. 038
1949 0. 009 0. 041 1969 0. 006 0. 031
1950 0. 008 0. 041 1 970 0. 005 0. 038
1951 0. 008 0. 040 1971 0. 005 0. 040
1 952 0. 009 0. 038 1 972 0. 005 0. 033
1953 0. 012 0. 033 1973 0. 005 0. 027
1954 0. 011 0. 036 1974 0. 006 0. 029
1955 0. 010 0. 048 1975 0. 007 0. 024
1956 0. 010 0. 047 1976 0. 006 0. 029
1957 0. 009 0. 040 1977 0. 006 0. 031
1 958 0. 007 0. 040 1 978 0. 004 0. 029
1959 0. 006 0. 047 1 979 0. 004 0. 036
1960 0. 007 0. 043 1980 0. 005 0. 039
1 961 0. 007 0. 041 1981 0. 005 0. 036
1962 0. 007 0. 040 1982 0. 006 0. 032
1963 0. 007 0. 041 1983 0. 006 0. 037
1964 0. 007 0. 039
SOURCE: See Tables A1.21, A1.22, and A1.6.
Jable A2^4
ESTIMATED CONSUMPTION/INVESTMENT RATIO
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1 945 0. 01 4 0. 041 1 965 0. 009 0. 031
1 946 0. 01 5 0. 038 1966 0. 008 0. 028
1 947 0. 012 0. 028 1967 0. 008 0. 033
1948 0. 010 0. 029 1968 0. 008 0. 036
1949 0. 010 0. 035 1969 0. 007 0. 031
1950 0. 008 0. 035 1970 0. 007 0. 033
1951 0. 007 0„ 035 1971 0. 007 0. 041
1952 0. 008 0. 038 1972 0. 006 0. 033
1953 0. 013 0. 032 1973 0. 006 0. 026
1954 0. 013 0. 030 1974 0„ 007 0. 030
1955 0. 012 0. 042 1975 0. 010 0. 025
1956 0. 013 0. 045 1976 0. 009 0. 026
1957 0. 011 0. 037 1977 0. 009 0. 029
1958 0. 009 0. 034 1978 0. 007 0. 027
1959 0. 008 0. 043 1979 0. 005 0. 033
1960 0. 009 0. 041 1980 0. 006 0. 039
1 961 0. 009 0. 037 1981 0. 007 0. 037
1 962 0. 008 0. 036 1982 0. 008 0. 033
1963 0. 008 0. 039 1983 0. 007 0. 035
1964 0. 009 0. 040
SOURCE: See Tables A1.21, A1.22, A1.7, and
A1. 8.
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ESTIMATED UNDERUTILIZED PRODUCTION CAPACITY 
THOUSAND HEAD
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
YEAR
CATTLE
AND
CALVES
HOGS
AND
PIGS
1945 0 0 1965 0 -21646
1946 -512 -4133 1 966 -455 -15060
1 947 -452 -3538 1967 -281 -9276
1948 -2032 -3001 1968 0 -6431
1949 -1407 0 1969 0 -11910
1 950 -256 0 1970 0 0
1951 0 0 1971 0 -3790
1952 0 -11757 1972 0 -11140
1 953 0 -22672 1973 0 -13591
1 954 0 -13756 1974 0 -17970
1 955 -489 -4857 1975 -690 -30528
1956 -1 225 -11160 1976 -3489 -1 7319
1957 -2696 -1 3224 1977 -4942 -15552
1958 -3741 -7053 1978 -7055 -13202
1959 -3663 -1191 1979 -8277 0
1960 -3246 -12370 1 980 -5935 -1072
1961 -2421 -7871 1981 -6207 -8939
1962 -1160 -6978 1982 -6673 -17603
1963 -333 -6530 1983 -6948 -9637
1964 0 -13042
SOURCE: See Tables A1. 6.
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Table A2._6
DIRECT STATE PAYMENTS TO THE FARM SECTOR
Year MILLIONS OF Year MILLIONS OF
1967 DOLLARS 1967 DOLLARS
1945 1, 697 1965 2, 616
1946 1, 429 1 966 3, 361
1947 510 1967 3, 079
1948 391 1968 3, 297
1949 283 1 969 3, 422
1 950 425 1 970 3, 177
1951 409 1 971 2, 543
1 952 387 1972 3» 058
1 953 295 1 973 1, 891
1 954 351 1974 352
1955 302 1975 489
1956 708 1976 418
1957 1, 253 1977 970
1958 1, 316 1 978 1, 507
1959 805 1 979 628
1960 816 1980 539
1961 1, 71 8 1981 738
1 962 1, 966 1982 1, 254
1963 1, 879 1 983 3, 215
1964 2, 380
SOURCE: Lucier, et al. ( 1986:14). See
also A. 1.
NOTES 
Chapter I
1
The terms "Fundamentalist”, which has been borrowed from Fine and 
Harris (1979), and "Underconsumptionist" refer to two Marxist schools 
of thought on crises. Neither my presentation of the Fundamentalist 
approach nor my account of the Underconsumptionist perspective is 
taken entirely from any one theorist. Rather, my work here compares 
two broad traditions within the Marxian paradigm, relying on a variety 
of representative works for each perspective.
2
Those who have argued for the Fundamentalist perspective on 
theoretical grounds include Mattick (1969), Cogoy (1973), and Yaffe 
(1973), to name just a few. The principal Underconsumptionist 
theorists are Baran and Sweezy (Sweezy, 1970; Baran,1957; Baran and 
Sweezy,1966).
3
Admittedly, raising and feeding livestock are two distinct economic 
enterprises (see e.g. Martin, 1979: 85-118; Boykin, et al. ,1980; 
Van Arsdall and Gilliam, 1979:190-254; Van Arsdall,1978). This study 
considers the two processes as one to simplify the collection and 
reporting of data. For similar reasons, sheep are excluded from my 
definition of red meat animals.
4
Even though there are several different expressions for the organic 
composition of capital, the expression used here (c / v + s) is the
1 1 7
most useful (see Bright, 1977: 203-204). For a theoretical criticism of 
this expression see Fine and Harris (1979:58-75).
Chapter II
1
Because my estimating procedures for land may not be immediately 
comprehensible, the following illustration will perhaps assist the 
reader. For this example, let us say that we have complete knowledge 
of land costs and market receipts.
a) Total Land Costs for the Entire Farm Sector = $280.00
b) Total Private Farmland = 28 Acres
c) Total Private Grazing and Pasture Land = 16 Acres
d) Total Private Farmland Devoted to Beef = 12 Acres
e) Beef Market Receipts = $6.00
f) Grazing Animals Market Receipts = $8.00
g) Average Value of All Farmland / Acre = $10.00
h) Average Value of Grazing and Pasture / Acre = $2.50
i) Total Land Costs for Beef Production = $30.00 (d * i)
In reality we do not know the total farmland devoted to beef (d) for 
all years s i n c e *1945. One could use the procedures presented in the 
text to find the unknown cost of land for beef production: Total land
qosts for the entire farm sector * (acres of private pasture and 
grassland / acres of all farmland)— $280.00 * ( 16 / 28) = $160.00.
Multiplying this by the average value of all grazing and pasture per 
acre / average value of all farmland per acre ($160.00 * $2.50 /
$10.00) equals $40.00. Taking that product and multiplying it by beef 
market receipts / market receipts from grazing animals ($40.00 A $6.00 
/ $8,00) finds the portion of livestock land costs that belongs to
beef production, $30. 00.
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Chanter III
1
I used "exponential smoothing" to calculate a "moving average" that 
minimizes random fluctuations in the data and allows us to visualize 
serial trends. The exponential smoothing technique employed here is 
as follows: the plotted trend value for a given year equals the
plotted trend value for the previous year plus a portion of the
difference between the actual value for the previous year and the
plotted trend for that year. The portion of the difference between 
the actual value for the previous year and the plotted trend value for 
that year is set at 20%. For example, the plotted trend value of 1960 
equals the plotted trend value of 1959 plus 20% of the difference 
between the actual value for 1959 and the plotted value for 1959. See 
SAS Institute Inc. , 1984: 31 4-31 5.
2
Because the ordinary least squares method yields inflated 
statistical correlations for serial variables, the Yule-Ralker 
regression technique is used to attain more accurate results. All of 
the regression equations reported here use the Yule-Halker technique. 
See SAS Institute Inc. , 1984: 183-219.
3
The results for "utilization of productive capacity" (UTL PCAP) and 
"direct state payments to the farm sector" ( GOV PAY) are reported in 
millions and billions of dollars respectively.
b i b l i o g r a p h y
Agricultural Statistics
1984 Agricultural Statistics 1945 to 1 984. Hashington D. C. :
8. S. Department of Agriculture.
Baran, Paul A.
1957 The Political Economy of Growth. New York: Monthly
Review Press.
Baran, Paul A. and Paul M. Sweezy
1966 Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Bell, Peter F.
1977 "Marxist theory, class struggle, and the crisis of
capitalism." Pp. 170-94 in Jesse Schwartz (ed.). The 
Subtle Anatomy of Capitalism. Santa Monica: Goodyear
Publishing.
Bell, Peter F. and Harry Cleaver
1982 "Marx's crisis theory as a theory of class struggle."
Research in Political Economy 5:189-261.
Bleaney, Michael
1976 Underconsumption Theories. New York: International
Publishers.
Boykin, Calvin C. , Henry C. Gilliam, and Ronald A. Gustafson
1980 Structural Characteristics of Beef Cattle Raising in the
United States. Hashington D. C. : U. S. Department of
Agriculture.
Cogoy, Mario
1973 "The fall in the rate of profit and the theory of
accumulation: a reply to Paul Sweezy. " Bulletin of the
Conference of Socialist Economists 7:52-67.
Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector
1984 Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector. Hashington
D. C. : U. S. Department of Agriculture.
Economic Report of the President
1986 Economic Report of the President. Hashington D.C. :
U.S. Government Printing Office.
Fine, Ben and Laurence Harris
1979 Rereading Capital. New York: Columbia University
Press.
1 20
Foster, John Bellamy
1986 The Theory of Monopoly Capitalism. New York: Monthly
Review Press.
Gillman, J.
1957 The Falling Rate of Profit. London: Dobson.
Habermas, Jurgen
1973 Legitimation Crisis. Tr. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: 
Beacon Press.
Hodgson, Geoff
1974 "The falling rate of profit." New Left Review 84:55-82.
Itoh, Makoto
1978 "The formation of Marx's theory of crisis." Science and
Society 42:129-55.
Juttner, D. Johannes and John H. Murray
1983 "Notes and numbers on Marx’s falling rate of profit."
The Economic Record 59:375-383.
Kalecki, Michael
1971 Selected Essays On the Dynamics of the Capitalist
Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kiser, Edgar and Kriss A. Drass
1987 "Changes in the core of the world-system and the 
production of utopian literature in Great Britain and 
the United States, 1883-1975." American Sociological 
Review 52:286-293.
Lappe, Frances Moore
1982 Diet For A Small Planet. New York: Random Hoiise.
Lucier, Gary, Agnes Chesley, and Mary Ahearn
1986 Farm Income Data: A Historical Perspective. Hashington
D. C. : U. S. Department of Agriculture.
Mandel, Ernest
1975 Late Capitalism. London: New Left Books.
1978 The Second Slump. Tr. Jon Rothschild. London: New
Left Books.
Marx, Karl
1973 Grundrisse. Tr. Martin Nicolaus. New York: Vintage
Books.
1 981 Capital. Volume III. Tr. David Fernbach. New York: 
Vintage Books.
1 21
Mason, Jim and Peter Singer
1980 Animal Factories. New York: Crown Publishers.
Martin, Rod J.
1979 "Beef." Pp. 85-118 in Lyle P. Schertz (ed. ). Another
Revolution in U. S. Farming? Hashington D. C. : 0. S.
Department of Agriculture.
Mattick, Paul
1969 Marx and Keynes. Boston: Porter Sargent.
1981 Economic Crisis and Crisis Theory. Tr. Paul Mattick Jr.
Hhite Plains, New York: M. E. Sharpe.
O' Connor, James
1973 The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St. Martin's
Press.
1984 Accumulation Crisis. New York: Basil Blackwell.
Robinson, Joan
1965 The Accumulation of Capital. London: Macmillan.
SAS Institute Inc.
1984 SAS/ETS User's Guide, Version 5 Edition. Cary, North
Carolina: SAS Institute Inc.
Shroyer, Trent
1970 "Epilogue: the critical paradigm". Pp. 210-34 in Hans
Peter Dreitzel (ed.). Recent Sociology Number 2. New 
York: Macmillan.
Skaggs, Jimmy M.
1986 Prime Cut: Livestock Raising and Meatpacking in the
United States, 1607-1983. College Station, Texas: 
University of Texas A 8. M Press.
Statistical Abstract of the United States
1986 Statistical Abstract of the United States. Hashington
D. C. : U. S. Department of Commerce.
Steindl, Joseph
1952 Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Sweezy, Paul M.
1970 The Theory of Capitalist Development. New York:
Monthly Review Press.
1 22
Szymanski, A1
1984 "Productivity growth and capitalist stagnation."
Science and Society 48:295^322.
U.S. Census of Agriculture
1978 U.S. Census of Agriculture. Hashington D. C. : U.S.
Department of Agriculture.
Van Arsdall, Roy N.
1978 Structural Characteristics of the U.S. Hog Production
Industry. Hashington D. C. : U. S. Department of
Agriculture.
Van Arsdall, Roy N. and Henry Gilliam
1979 "Pork." Pp. 1 90-254 in Lyle P. Schertz ( ed. ). Another
Revolution in U. S. Farming? Hashington D. C. : U. S.
Department of Agriculture.
Heeks, John
1981 Capital and Exploitation. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Hright, Erik Olin
1977 "Alternative perspectives in marxist theory of
accumulation and crisis". Pp. 195-231 in Jesse 
Schwartz ( ed. ). The Subtle Anatomy of Capitalism. 
Santa Monica: Goodyear Publishing.
Yaffe, David S.
1973 "The marxian theory of crisis, capital and the state."
Economy and Society 80:186-232.
